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MEDICINE AND LAW AS MODEL 
PROFESSIONS: THE HEART OF THE 
MATTER (AND HOW WE HAVE   
MISSED IT) 
 
Rob Atkinson
†
 
 
“Now I’ll put my meaning in a clearer light, if I can.  I maintain 
that these two, body and soul, have two arts corresponding to them; 
that which deals with the soul I call government, but though the sub-
ject of physical welfare constitutes a unity I cannot find a single name 
for the art which deals with the body, which has two branches, train-
ing and medicine.  In the art of government what corresponds to 
training is called legislation and what corresponds to medicine is 
called the administration of justice.  The members of each of these 
pairs, training and medicine, legislation and justice, have something 
in common, because they are concerned with the same object, but they 
  
 †
  Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.   The Florida 
State University College of Law has generously supported my scholarship in profes-
sionalism and other fields for nearly a quarter of a century now, most generously 
under the nearly two decades of Donald Weidner’s admirable deanship.  On this 
particular project I am indebted to my research assistants Sara Hassler and Hannah 
Monroe and to the staff of the FSU College of Law and its Research Center for inval-
uable support, always cheerfully given.  To two of my colleagues who work much 
more than I at the intersection of law and medicine, Marshall Kapp and Reid Fon-
taine, I owe special thanks for helping me find this article its happy placement here in 
Health Matrix.   
  In writing this article, I have often thought of my brother, Ernest McIntosh 
Atkinson, a family practitioner; my sister, Louise Atkinson Witherspoon, a physical 
therapist; and our late father, Robert Edward Atkinson, a rural veterinarian.   In our 
father’s large and small animal practice in Williamsburg County, South Carolina, we 
as children learned the kind of care that I have come to see as the core of the properly 
professional practice of medicine.   In this paper I have found myself describing the 
standard of care that my father delivered his entire working life.  No one could give or 
receive better care, or greater love.   May the day soon dawn when the kind of care 
our father gave the animals of that rural community, livestock no less than pets, be-
comes the birthright of every human being born anywhere in the world.  If this paper 
could help hasten that day, then my professional work would properly stand alongside 
his, and theirs.        
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are different from one another nonetheless.  We have then these four 
arts, constantly concerned with the highest welfare of the body and  
 
soul respectively . . . .” 
 
Plato
1
 
 
“The secret of the care of the patient is in caring for the patient.” 
 
Dr. Francis Weld Peabody
 2 
 
“[A] lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere work-
ing mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may call him-
self an architect.” 
 
Sir Walter Scott
3
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This article has two coordinate goals: to undergird the functional-
ist understanding of professionalism with classical normative theory 
and to advance the classical theory of civic virtue with the insights of 
modern social science.  More specifically, this article seeks to connect 
classical theories about the care of the body and the soul with modern 
theories of market and government failure.  The first step is to distin-
guish two kinds of professions, caring professions like medicine and 
public professions like law, by identifying the distinctive virtue of 
each.  The distinctive virtue of the caring professions is single-minded 
commitment to those in their care, their principals, to the virtual ex-
clusion of all other concerns; the distinctive virtue of the public pro-
fessions is commitment to the common good, sometimes even at the 
expense of their principals’ self-defined interest.  The next step is to 
show how these two distinctive professional virtues, the one principal-
protecting, the other public-protecting, branch from the same root, the 
common function of all proper professions:  guaranteeing the delivery 
of socially essential but necessarily esoteric knowledge when the usu-
  
 1 PLATO, GORGIAS 45–46 (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960) (statement attribut-
ed to Socrates). 
 2 JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 54 (2007) (quoting textual 
language as “[o]ne of the most celebrated statements in clinical medicine”). 
 3 WALTER SCOTT, GUY MANNERING 213 (P.D. Garside ed., Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press 1999) (1815). 
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al protections of both private contracts and government regulation 
systematically fail.  The third and final step is to map out the implica-
tions of this neo-classical understanding of professionalism, beginning 
at its core in the paradigmatic caring and public professions of medi-
cine and law, through putative professions that take these as their 
models, to the kind of republican society that places care of individu-
als and concern for the public welfare at the center of its value system.  
The result of this analysis should be not only a fuller theoretical ap-
preciation of professionalism’s proper function, but also a practical 
guide to professionals themselves for better service to both the indi-
viduals in their care and the common good of all humankind.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nearly everyone takes the three classic professions to be law, 
medicine, and the clergy.
4
  By virtually all accounts – professional 
and lay, practical and theoretical, favorable and critical – this trinity of 
occupations, holy or otherwise, shares the core of what a profession 
should be.  The breadth of this agreement is hardly an accident; it con-
tains more than a grain of truth.  But this agreement needs deeper 
analysis, because it also contains a fundamental mistake: the assump-
  
 4 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 32 (1986) (“As we all know, the 
medieval universities of Europe spawned the three original learned professions of 
medicine, law, and the clergy (of which university teaching was part).”); MAGALI 
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4–5 
(1977) (“In the Anglo-Saxon world at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
recognized gentlemanly professions were, in practice, only three: divinity, and its 
recent offshoot of university teaching; the law . . .  and the profession of medicine.”). 
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tion that all three classic professions, and by extension all proper 
modern professions, rest on the same foundation of liberal learning.  
That assumption is demonstrably false, and its consequences have 
been pernicious.   
From that bad seed has grown many a thorny problem in the aca-
demic study, self-perception, and public appreciation of the profes-
sions.  We need to learn about the three classic professions what Ses-
ame Street teaches about other incongruous catalogings: “One of these 
things is not like the others; one of these things doesn’t belong.”5  The 
odd one out among the classic professions, this article argues, is med-
icine; once we see why the practice of medicine does not necessarily 
entail liberal learning, we can appreciate not only medicine’s distinc-
tive and legitimate claim to professional status, but also the common 
function of all proper professions.   
By contrast, the practice of law, properly understood, closely ap-
proximates functionalist theory’s ideal type of the classic profession: 
an occupation that serves an essential social value by combining eso-
teric technical knowledge with general cultural knowledge in a way 
that neither the regulatory state nor for-profit firms can  guarantee as 
well, alone or together, as the occupation’s own institutions.6  With 
necessary adjustments for the clergy’s place in modern secular socie-
ties, an equally plausible case can be made for that occupation’s pro-
fessional standing as well.
7
  The problem lies with medicine, the third 
member of the classic professional trinity that is now very much pri-
mus inter pares.   
Medicine’s status as a profession poses this basic dilemma.  On 
the one hand, the practice of medicine is not only a supremely im-
portant occupation, as Socrates anciently insisted; it is also the para-
digmatic profession in our modern world.  Physicians now eclipse 
lawyers and the clergy in what, at least for the laity, are the hallmarks 
of professional status:  income, prestige, and power.  In explicit 
recognition of this standing, theorists of professionalism have tended 
to take the practice of medicine as our society’s closest approximation 
  
 5 One of These Things: Hat, SESAME STREET, 
http://www.sesamestreet.org/video_player/-/pgpv/videoplayer/0/96480d64-694e-
44dc-8140-8c65f68d93cb (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 6 See Robert E. Atkinson, Jr., Laying the Foundations for Neo-Classical 
Professionalism in Law and Business, 10 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL. (forthcom-
ing 2013). 
 7 See Rob Atkinson, The Western Christian Clergy: From Most Profession-
alized Occupation to Least (and Back?) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor). 
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to the ideal-type profession, the model of what a profession should be 
if it were to function properly.
8
   
On the other hand, the practice of medicine today lacks what pro-
fessionalism’s most sophisticated defenders take to be one of an ideal-
type profession’s defining attributes: an essential link between highly 
technical, socially valuable knowledge and a university-level liberal 
education.  Put less abstractly, this is the rub: to serve you well, your 
lawyer, when you really need one (and your clergy-person, should you 
ever want one) must have not only a deep knowledge of the humani-
ties, but also at least a passing familiarity with both the physical and 
the social sciences; your physician need only know the “hard” scienc-
es (unless it is your psyche that is sick).
9
   
This article addresses the dilemma of medicine’s professional sta-
tus with a double thesis: (1) the common core of all proper professions 
is a peculiar genus of occupational virtue; and (2) that genus has two 
main species, the principal-protecting, or caring, and the public-
protecting, or public.  That is the heart of the matter we have missed: 
the practice of medicine is the proper paradigm, not of professional-
ism in general, but of the caring professions in particular.  Medical 
doctors need not master liberal learning to perform their social func-
tion properly.   
But that function itself is literally vital: preserving and promoting 
life itself, the very foundation of all other human values.  To perform 
that function properly, medical doctors must take the care of their 
individual patients as wholly to heart as is humanly possible.  We, 
both as individuals and as a society, deeply want our doctors, day in 
and day out, to be caring and careful, to care for our lives as much and 
  
 8 See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001); ELIOT 
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED 
KNOWLEDGE (1970); LARSON, supra note 4, at xi (“The elements that compose the 
ideal-type profession appear to be drawn from the practice and from the ideology of 
the established professions; medicine, therefore, as the most powerful and successful 
of these, should approximate most closely the sociological criteria of what professions 
are and do.”); Harold J. Cook, Good Advice and Little Medicine: The Professional 
Authority of Early Modern English Physicians, 33 J. BRITISH STUD. 1, 2 (1994) (“As 
one of the three learned professions surviving from the Middle Ages, the ‘medical 
profession’ has been a crucial test case for various definitions of what a profession is 
or was.”) (citation omitted).  Id. at n.1 (listing examples of major sociological studies 
of professionalism that have focused on medicine); see also ANDREW ABBOTT, THE 
SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 20 (1988) 
(“Let us begin with the familiar case of American medicine.”).  Id. at 189 (“The most 
familiar example of the shift to scientific legitimacy claims is that of nineteenth cen-
tury medicine.”). 
 9 We take up the exceptional case of psychotherapy later in this article.  See 
infra Part III.A.2. 
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as well as they can, to the very limits of human capability.  Doctors 
routinely hold our very lives, sometimes quite literally our hearts, in 
their hands.  The kind of care appropriate to that situation is precisely 
what sets medicine apart as a profession and makes it the paradigm of 
all caring professions. 
Again, to put the matter less abstractly, if your lawyer is a bit 
careless in handling your case (and if your plea is not for an eleventh-
hour stay of execution), you’ll most likely live to have a second law-
yer amend any mistakes your first may have made.  But if your family 
doctor fails to notice that that mold just above your hairline has taken 
an angry turn since your last routine check-up, you may very well die 
of metastatic melanoma, quite soon and quite painfully.
10
   
Medicine, then, is better seen as the model, not of a learned pro-
fession, but of a caring profession.  We certainly need doctors, and we 
need those doctors to be deeply committed to our care, not just rigor-
ously trained and closely regulated.  But those doctors do not general-
ly need, as an essential part of their job-performance, a thorough 
grounding in the humanities and social sciences.    
Failing to appreciate this distinction between a learned profession 
and a caring profession has had the most profound of consequences, in 
both theory and practice.  On the theoretical side, it has fundamentally 
distorted our understanding of professionalism itself.  On the practical 
side, it has seriously jeopardized the proper education of profession-
als.  And that, in turn, has jeopardized the proper rendering of profes-
sional services, and thus the good of both individuals and society, not 
least our professionals themselves.  We have made a very big mistake 
about medicine, and we need to fix it fast.     
Part I of this paper begins this reassessment of medicine’s unique 
status as a profession by sketching the necessary background: the 
broader debate over whether any occupation, in order to apply special-
ized knowledge to an essential social function, must be organized 
along the lines of the classic professions, with its members’ perfor-
mance guaranteed in important part by institutions internal to the oc-
cupation itself and distinct from the institutions of both the market and 
the state.  The second section of Part I isolates the problem of medi-
cine under the prevailing definition.  Although classic professionalism 
theory holds that the professions must entail a wedding of technical 
  
 10 As your medical file closes, of course, your legal file may open.  Once 
you’re gone, your lawyer can see that your family is fully compensated for your doc-
tor’s oversight, at least in the contemplation of the law.  But that legal relief is likely 
to be small consolation to your loved ones (not to mention you!), a distant second-
best to the longer, fuller life that proper medical care would have given you. 
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knowledge and general knowledge,
11
 the need for that “wedding” is 
dubious in the case of medicine.  This section shows why the practice 
of medicine, in contrast to law, does not really require a liberal educa-
tion, and thus why medicine’s distinctive occupational status must be 
found elsewhere.    
Part II undertakes that more positive task.  The first step is to dis-
tinguish two kinds of professions—caring professions like medicine 
and public professions like law—by identifying the distinctive virtue 
of each.  The distinctive virtue of the caring professions is single-
minded commitment to those in their care, their principals, to the vir-
tual exclusion of all other concerns; the distinctive virtue of the public 
professions is commitment to the common good, sometimes even at 
the expense of their principals’ self-defined interest.  The next step is 
to show how these two distinctive professional virtues branch from 
the same root, the common function of all proper professions: guaran-
teeing the delivery of socially essential but necessarily esoteric 
knowledge when the usual protections of both private contracts and 
government regulation systematically fail.  Building upon these in-
sights—the fundamental structure of professional virtue and the essen-
tial role of professional institutions in promoting that virtue—the final 
section of Part II outlines a refinement of the functionalist theory of 
the professions.        
Part III works out the implications of that refined theory of the 
professions, in principle and in practice, from the specific to the gen-
eral.  Its first section applies that theory to the paradigmatic caring and 
public professions, medicine and law.  The second section widens the 
focus of the revised theory to examine the professional claims of other 
occupations and to compare professional virtues with other occupa-
tional virtues.  The final section turns the analytic lens around and 
raises, albeit only in a tentative way, the converse question: What kind 
of society does the neo-classical theory of the professions imply?  
Answering that question highlights the neo-classical republican ele-
ments in our present society, shared norms beyond both majority will 
and consumer preference.   
And that, in turn, brings us around to understanding the problem 
with which we began: mistaking liberal learning as an essential ele-
ment of the practice of medicine.  A neo-classical republic honors 
wisdom above all other virtues.  Its lawyers must make that virtue the 
foundation of their profession, if they are to protect the common good; 
all of its ablest citizens—doctors as well as lawyers, layfolk as well as 
  
 11 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121. 
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professionals—must make wisdom not only the goal of their personal 
lives, but also the measure of their commonwealth. 
 
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL FAUX PAS: MISTAKING LIBERAL 
LEARNING AS ESSENTIAL TO ALL PROPER PROFESSIONS 
 
Certain occupations in our society have secured especially high 
social, economic, and political status by successfully claiming that 
they alone can best provide socially essential esoteric knowledge, and 
only under conditions of considerable occupational autonomy.  These 
are the professions.  The professions pose to those who study them 
two basic questions, one descriptive, the other normative.  The de-
scriptive question is this: What identifiable aspects of an occupation 
qualify it as a profession?  The answer to that descriptive question, in 
turn, poses the normative question: Does a given profession—or any 
profession at all—actually merit its special status?   
Students of the professions have tended to agree on the answer to 
the basic descriptive question, what an ideal-type profession would 
look like, even as they radically divide in their answer to the basic 
normative question, whether professions are a necessary mode of or-
ganizing the provision of certain services essential to the common 
good, or whether professions are the means by which certain occupa-
tions have been able to gain control of the provision of certain ser-
vices to their own advantage as suppliers and to the detriment of the 
public as consumers.
12
  Functionalists believe the professions serve 
the common good;
13
 revisionists insist that they subvert it.
14
  
  
 12 Or, as stated by a contemporary sociologist of the professions, 
 
 The crucial characteristic of the knowledge systems of professionals, 
as they have been perceived in the discussions of professionalism of 
recent years, is to what extent they really serve a problem-solving 
purpose which in turn gives power and prestige to the owners of this 
capacity, or to what extent the knowledge is a symbolic value that 
serves the purpose of being something that can be brought forward in 
other people’s eyes as important but which has no clear relation to the 
problem-solving capacity of professionals. 
 
Rolf Torstendahl, Introduction: Promotion and Strategies of Knowledge-Based 
Groups, in THE FORMATION OF PROFESSIONS: KNOWLEDGE, STATE AND STRATEGY 1, 3 
(Rolf Torstendahl & Michael Burrage, eds., 1990). 
 13 See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43 (1954). 
 14 The leading general work in this vein is LARSON, supra note 4; as for the 
legal profession in particular, see Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions 
of Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 186, 186–
87 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S 
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All scholars, functionalists and revisionists alike, agree that any 
occupation’s claim to professional status rests on applying a body of 
specialized knowledge in the provision of an essential service, the 
proper delivery of which can only be guaranteed by institutions inter-
nal to the occupation itself and relatively independent of both the 
market and the state.
15
  This claim has three distinct components: (1) 
certain occupations provide essential services that entail a distinctive 
kind of knowledge; (2) optimal provision of those services cannot be 
guaranteed by ordinary contracts between service providers and ser-
vice consumers, even with the routine intervention of the regulatory 
state; but (3) institutions within the occupation itself can, given suffi-
cient power and autonomy, ensure optimal provision (or, more pre-
cisely, provision that is superior to any feasible alternative).
16
  Func-
tionalist defenders of professionalism affirm all three of these proposi-
tions; revisionist critics challenge one or more.   
But, again, all scholars implicitly agree that, if there are to be le-
gitimate professions, these three conditions must all be met.  What is 
more, scholars also generally agree that medicine is the paradigmatic 
profession.
17
  If any occupation deserves to be a profession, it is medi-
cine; if medicine cannot be shown to warrant professional status, nei-
ther can any other occupation.  Part I shows how both halves of this 
double claim come a cropper when we look closely at medicine and 
law under the prevailing paradigm: on the one hand, not all classic 
professions are necessarily learned, because medicine cannot be 
shown to require liberal learning; on the other hand, liberal learning is 
essential to at least one other classic profession, the law.    
Part I.A sets out the general understanding of professions as 
uniquely effective providers of specialized knowledge, using the clas-
sic professions of law and medicine as examples.  Part I.B narrows the 
focus on professional knowledge to isolate what is supposed to sepa-
rate proper professions from other occupations that entail special 
knowledge, traditional artisans on the one hand and modern techni-
  
DILEMMA 16 (Penguin Books reprt. 1965) (calling professions “conspiracies against 
the laity”); and see also ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 7 (“For some, professionalism was a 
means of controlling a difficult social relation; for others, a species of corporate extor-
tion.”).   
 15 See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 7–8 (noting that theorists of the professions 
“[c]ertainly all agreed that a profession was an occupational group with some special 
skill” and using as his own working definition of professions “exclusive occupational 
groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases”). 
 16 See LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, BUSINESS – A PROFESSION 2 (1914). 
 17 See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 9, at 181; 
see LARSON, supra note 5, at xi; see also ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 30 (“It has been 
easy to mistake American medicine for the paradigm [of professional life].”). 
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cians on the other.  Unlike artisans and technicians, proper professions 
are said to be “learned”; their members must master not only a body 
of special occupational knowledge, but also the advanced cultural 
knowledge associated with a college-level liberal education.
18
  Part 
I.C then looks for that hybrid of special and general knowledge in two 
paradigmatically learned professions, law and medicine.  This search 
yields decidedly different results for law and medicine.  The general 
assumption that professional services necessarily entail liberal learn-
ing nicely fits the practice of law but poses insurmountable problems 
when applied to medicine.  A central aspect of the practice of law—
making plausible appeals to the public good—requires just that inte-
gration of advanced occupational and cultural knowledge.  But the 
same cannot be said of medicine; its claim to professional status, as 
Part II shows, must lie elsewhere.      
    
A. The Functionalist Thesis: Professions as a Re-
sponse to Both Market and Government Failure in 
the Provision of Necessary Specialized Knowledge 
 
As we have seen, all students of the professions, from the most 
optimistic functionalist to the most skeptical revisionist, agree on this: 
the legitimacy of any occupation’s claim to be organized as an ideal-
type profession rests on that occupation’s delivery of a particular kind 
of specialized knowledge.  To qualify as a profession, an occupation 
must deliver a form of esoteric knowledge that is essential to the per-
formance of an important social function but that cannot be guaran-
teed by either the market or the state, but only by largely autonomous 
institutions of the occupation itself.
19
  
This is, admittedly, both a complex and an abstract formula.  The 
first step in unpacking it is to notice that it entails implicit claims of 
superiority to two other sources or guarantors of that specialized 
  
 18 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121 
(“The ideology of professionalism asserts knowledge that is not merely the narrow 
depth of the technician, or the shallow breadth of a generalist, but rather a wedding of 
the two in a unique marriage. This wedding of liberal education to specialized training 
qualifies professionals to be more than mere technicians.”). 
 19 Id. at 78–79 (“In professionalism, sheltered labor markets for particular 
jurisdictions in a division of labor are created on the basis of a claim to be able to 
perform a defined set of discretionary tasks satisfactorily.”).  See Torstendahl, supra 
note 12, at 3 (noting agreement of professionalism scholars on centrality of claims 
about specialized knowledge).  Functionalism had earlier proponents among social 
reformers who were also theorists, particularly Louis Brandeis in the United States 
and R. H. Tawney in the United Kingdom.  See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF 
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 123 (1998) (noting close parallels between 
Progressives like Brandeis and functionalist sociologists like Parsons). 
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knowledge, the market and the state.  The professions, in other words, 
are a double default mode in our basic system of state-regulated capi-
talist markets.  In that system, consumers’ first recourse for 
knowledge beyond their ken is to enter into ordinary contracts with 
private, for-profit firms; if those for some reason fail, consumers then 
look to government intervention in the market.  Only when routine 
market provision and state regulation both fail do consumers look to 
professions as the appropriate providers.  To understand the claims of 
professionalism to provide special knowledge, then, we need to look 
first for the kind of special knowledge that would not be readily avail-
able by purchase from private firms through garden-variety, two-party 
contracts.    
But that is just the first step to showing why the occupation must 
be organized as a profession.  Having identified this specialized 
knowledge, we must then identify reasons why government interven-
tion is not an appropriate remedy.  The professions’ claim to provide 
specialized knowledge, in other words, will require both a market 
failure theory and a government failure theory.  And so it does.
20
 
 
1. Market Failures in the Provision of   
Specialized Knowledge 
 
The claim that professions provide specialized knowledge una-
vailable from ordinary private firms involves two common forms of 
market failure identified by neo-classical economists, information 
asymmetries and externalities.
21
  The former market failure occurs 
between the consumer and the provider; the latter occurs between the 
consumer and provider, on the one hand, and third parties, strangers to 
the transaction between the provider and consumer, on the other.
22
  To 
illustrate both kinds of problems, let’s consider a paradigmatic medi-
  
 20 Analysis comes from the following law review article and the sources 
cited therein: Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Cru-
sade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 271–73 (1995). 
 21 As I have noted elsewhere, the standard account of the professions was 
first theoretically articulated by sociologists, and theirs is still the most detailed ac-
count.  See id. at 272–73.  For purposes of our analysis, however, functionalism’s 
primary thesis is most cogently outlined in terms of neo-classical economics.  Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 489 (1988) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (warning that lawyers have the power to abuse their clients for their 
own benefit and the legal system for their clients’ benefit); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 92–93 (1995) (arguing that competitive pressures force lawyers to 
focus on serving the customer, their client, at the expense of the courts and the com-
munity); Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Schol-
arship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1922 (1993). 
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cal activity, surgery, and a paradigmatic lawyerly activity, medical 
malpractice litigation. 
 
a. Information Asymmetries: The 
Threat of Professionals to their Own 
Principals  
 
With respect to consumers of professional services, the problem is 
information asymmetry.
23
  Remember the underlying facts in Hawkins 
v. McGee,
24
 the contracts casebook classic.
25
  A young man needs a 
skin transplant to restore a badly injured hand.  He can neither per-
form the operation himself nor learn how at reasonable cost.  Even if 
he knew how, it would be devilishly difficult to do the work himself, 
literally single-handedly.  What is more, he cannot assess at reasona-
ble cost whether anyone who purports to have the necessary 
knowledge and skill actually does have it and can be trusted to use it 
properly.  He seems to need a professional, someone whom knowl-
edgeable and trustworthy third parties certify has the necessary skills 
and applies them appropriately.    
That was not, of course, quite what Mr. Hawkins got.  Either be-
cause Dr. McGee lacked the relevant knowledge or because he failed 
to apply that knowledge properly to Mr. Hawkins’s hand, the hair 
follicles of the skin transplanted to his palm were not destroyed; Mr. 
Hawkins was left, as every first-year law student knows, with a “hairy 
hand,” the basis for a malpractice suit against Dr. McGee.26  
Mr. Hawkins sought from his lawyer, as from his doctor, the 
proper application of specialized knowledge.  Here, too, he would 
have met information asymmetries.  A litigator must be able to assess 
the relative merits of the client’s case, the likely gains from prevailing 
in that case over against the costs of prosecuting it, and the relative 
advantages of other modes of pursuing relief.  And this is only the 
  
 23 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 112–13 (7th ed. 
2007); MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
66–67 (1996).  See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 
79 (“The requirement of discretionary specializations . . . and most particularly those 
based on esoteric, abstract theory, poses a serious problem to prospective labor con-
sumers.  How are they to judge whether a particular worker is able to perform tasks 
adequately?”). 
 24 146 A. 641, 642–43 (N.H. 1929).  
 25 THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 259–62 (3d ed. 1999); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN 
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 190–93 (8th ed. 2006); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ET 
AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 2–4 (7th ed. 2008); JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., 
CONTRACTS CASES AND COMMENTS 2–6 (9th ed. 2008).  
 26 DAWSON, supra note 25, at 2–6. 
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beginning.  Once the case is underway, the lawyer must make a host 
of similarly complex assessments: whether to call a particular witness, 
whether to make an especially novel argument, whether to invoke an 
obscure line of precedent.  The appropriate answer to each of these 
questions is difficult for lay-folk like Mr. Hawkins to assess.  He can-
not know whether a particular claim or strategy will succeed without 
studying law himself or taking other self-protective measures that are 
prohibitively expensive.  As with Mr. Hawkins’s doctor, then, so too 
with his lawyer: the services he needs from the one, like those from 
the other, are so unusual or complex that ordinary consumers like him 
cannot, at reasonable cost to themselves, independently evaluate 
whether the service actually delivered is of the quality promised or 
reasonably expected.
27
  To assess whether their lawyers and doctors 
get these decisions right, clients and patients would need to have pre-
cisely the kind of knowledge that they lack, the kind of knowledge 
that leads them to need, and to hire, a lawyer or doctor in the first 
place.
28
   
Conversely, both surgeons and litigators have an incentive to 
trade on their superior knowledge—and consumers’ relative igno-
rance—to the consumers’ disadvantage, in either of two basic ways.  
They can claim to have special expertise they lack, or they can cut 
corners and fail to take proper care in providing the knowledge they 
do have.  The usual rule of the market, caveat emptor, would work 
badly in such cases; here the buyer may not know what to beware of, 
or even to beware at all.  The fundamental problem for the consumers 
of services involving esoteric occupational knowledge, then, is one of 
information asymmetry—buying, not the proverbial pig in a poke, but 
the performance of a service in a black box.  In the case of lawyers, 
that black box is the camera obscura of litigation; in the case of doc-
tors, it may literally be the client’s own skull, rib cage, or abdominal 
cavity.   
 
 
  
 27 DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 646 (1st ed. 1992) 
(describing “information barriers” as the inability of consumers to accurately assess 
the legal services they receive and concluding that this is an appropriate reason to 
regulate lawyers); see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 490 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that ordinary fraud provisions cannot protect clients from lawyers’ abuse of spe-
cialized knowledge). 
 28 See SIMON, supra note 19, at 123 (“The market is not viable because con-
sumers lack the expertise to evaluate the quality of such services.”). 
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b. Externalities: The Threat of     
Professionals and their Principals to 
Third Parties and the Public 
 
Information asymmetries, we have seen, are the problem that pu-
tative professionals pose to the purchasers of their services.  The pur-
chase of professional services poses a second set of problems, exter-
nalities, to those outside the transaction.   Because some costs and 
benefits of a transaction do not affect the parties to the transaction, but 
are in that sense “external” to them, the parties tend to ignore them.  
As a result, they tend to produce and consume the service in socially 
non-optimal amounts, and the consequences of their less than ideal 
consumption decisions fall on others.
29
  In our paradigmatic medical 
and legal services (surgery and litigation), two recurrent problems—
undercompetence and overzealousness—nicely illustrate the basic 
externality problems. 
 
(1) Undercompetence 
 
Let’s consider first the simpler problem, undercompetence.  As 
we have already seen, undercompetence is often a problem for the 
purchaser of the service; Dr. McGee’s undercompetence is probably 
what caused Mr. Hawkins’s “hairy hand.”  But that will not always be 
the case.  If a consumer is in a position to recognize undercompetence 
or minimize its risks, that consumer may well use it to his or her ad-
vantage.  Thus a client might well be willing to hire a lawyer relative-
ly lacking in basic professional knowledge, on the assumption that 
such a lawyer will be comparatively cheap, even though the client 
knows the quality of service delivered will be correspondingly low.  
Assuming the client can assess the quality of the service delivered (in 
other words, there is no information asymmetry), and looking only at 
the transaction in terms of the lawyer and client, this is not particular-
ly troubling.  Some go to orthopedists with their back pain, others 
consult chiropractors or Christian Science healers, still others self-
medicate with alcohol or other drugs.  Similarly, some discuss the 
viability of their legal claims with lawyers, others never get past their 
bar tenders, or file pro se in small claims court.  All, we can assume 
for present purposes, get what they pay for.     
But the costs of undercompetence may not always be so nicely 
self-contained within the relationship of consumer and supplier, the 
  
 29 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982) (presenting 
the elimination of “spillover” costs as the classical rationale for governmental regula-
tion). 
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client and lawyer in our example.  If the ill-preparedness of the lawyer 
causes delays in court, or requires the judge to spend time and energy 
prompting or correcting the lawyer, then some of the costs of under-
competence are borne, not by the consumer (the lawyer’s client), but 
by the rest of us, in the form of  docket crowding or additional judges.  
So, too, with at least some forms of health care.  If my faith healer 
fails to reduce my back pain, the discomfort is pretty much limited to 
me (although I may remain a pretty grouchy co-worker).  But if my 
doctor dismisses my cough as the symptom of a common cold, rather 
than diagnosing it as an early sign of tuberculosis, you too may suffer, 
particularly if I’m your caterer or barista.  Thus society, on purely 
efficiency grounds, has a legitimate interest in preventing consumers 
from externalizing such costs, whether they be associated with legal 
assistance or health care.
30
 
 
(2) Excessive Zeal 
 
Excessive zeal, the second source of externalities relevant to our 
analysis, is essentially the converse of undercompetence.  Service 
providers can be excessively as well as insufficiently attentive to their 
clients, and this excessive zeal can produce external costs of its own.
31
  
Suppose litigational delay on the lawyer’s part is not a by-product of 
undercompetence, but a carefully calculated strategy to achieve client 
advantage at the expense of another party.  The client will, to be sure, 
have to pay the lawyer to undertake these “hard-ball,” “pit-bull,” 
“scorched-earth” tactics.  “But,” as I have argued elsewhere, “if the 
client does not also have to pay either the opposing party’s legal fees 
in responding to such measures or society’s costs in wasted judicial 
time and general fraying of the social fabric, the client has a perverse 
economic incentive to engage in tactics that no neutral observer would 
believe conducive to a resolution of the case on its merits.”32  
Medical care can pose parallel problems.  If my physician over-
prescribes antibiotics to me, the super-bugs that evolve may become a 
scourge to you as well.
33
  More generally, if someone other than the 
  
 30 See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsi-
bility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 705, 710–11 (1977) (“[T]he costs of dispute resolution 
and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties—the social costs 
involved are borne by society as a whole.”).  
 31 See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 489 (citing “abuse of the discovery process” as 
an example of “overly zealous representation of the client’s interests”). 
 32 Atkinson, supra note 20, at 273. 
 33 See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 27, at 647 (referring to the public’s inter-
est in the efficient resolution of disputes “in circumstances where individual clients 
would be willing to pay lawyers to delay or impede truth-finding processes”); Ronald 
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patient pays for medical care, the doctor and patient may be tempted 
to pursue more therapies than might be appropriate if benefits were 
more objectively balanced against their full costs.    
 
c. Summary 
 
These examples of information asymmetries and external costs all 
suggest that at least some of the paradigmatic services rendered by 
both lawyers and doctors are not likely to be optimally provided by 
ordinary contracts between providers and consumers, lawyers and 
doctors on the one hand and clients and patients on the other.  In the 
case of information asymmetries, providers have incentives to give 
consumers less than they are paying for.  In the case of externalities, 
producers and consumers together tend to pass costs onto third parties 
or the public.  To avoid these market failures, lawyers and doctors 
must be induced to deploy specialized knowledge in ways that ordi-
nary market forces may not optimally reward.      
 
2. Government Failure in Regulating the  
Provision of Specialized Knowledge 
 
The standard response to these classic market failures is govern-
mental intervention.  That intervention, mapped along a spectrum 
from the least intrusive to the most, includes subsidizing or penalizing 
suppliers, imposing mandatory government standards, or even out-
right government provision of the product in question.  In the context 
of professional services, these regulatory measures typically include 
the following: special educational requirements, to ensure that the 
professionals are capable of providing the service in question; special 
fiduciary duties, to ensure that the services of the requisite quality are 
provided; and third-party monitoring of both training and service de-
livery.
34
  Broadly stated, these market-correcting regulatory measures 
must ensure that the unqualified do not deliver services and that the 
qualified deliver them as promised, at an appropriate level of quality, 
and without excessive costs to either clients or third parties.
35
  In prin-
  
J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 
MD. L. REV. 869, 873–77 (1990) (outlining an economic justification for “the 
Rawlsian . . . prohibition of strategic litigation” contained in Model Rule 3.1). 
 34 Atkinson, supra note 20, at 272–73. 
 35 See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 220 
(explaining that consumer protection is especially important when “the profession’s 
skills are so complex and esoteric that lay people are not well enough informed to be 
able . . . to choose the competent over the incompetent”).  
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ciple, these regulatory correctives should be applied so long as their 
costs are lower than the benefits gained, so long, that is, as the pre-
scribed regimen of governmental regulation isn’t a cure more costly 
than the market malfunction it is intended to correct.   
Why, we have to wonder, wouldn’t these routine regulatory 
measures work to correct the market failures we have identified in the 
delivery of medical and legal services?  Here proponents of traditional 
professions like law and medicine interpose a critical objection: All 
the problems with market provisions of professional services have 
correlates on the government side; when we look for regulatory cor-
rections for these particular market failures, we run into corresponding 
government failures.  In these cases, in other words, the regulatory 
correctives generally prescribed for market failures are either unsafe 
or ineffective.   
All these government failures trace back to what functionalists 
take to be an essential feature of genuinely professional work.  The 
proper use of professional knowledge includes the ability to apply 
general principles or techniques to the particular case at hand, very 
like what the ancients called “phronesis,” or practical wisdom.36  This 
necessarily requires a large element of discretion which is, by its very 
nature, difficult to cabin with bright-line, categorical rules.
37
  Law, 
according to professionalism’s defenders, is distinctly ill-equipped to 
ensure that this kind of discretion is properly exercised.    
Consider, from this perspective, our earlier medical and legal ex-
amples.  As we have seen, the litigating lawyer must know, not only 
the substantive laws in which clients’ claims are grounded and the 
procedural laws by which those claims are asserted, but also subtle, 
difficult to calibrate matters such as what witnesses to call, how to 
question them, when to press on and when to leave off.  So, too, with 
doctors in the examination and treatment of particular patients.
38
   
Lawyers and doctors may omit some such measures because they 
do not know that those measures are critical in the case at hand; if 
you’ll pardon the pun, that may well have been the problem in Haw-
kins v. McGee.  Lawyers and doctors may also omit certain essential 
  
 36 See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31; 
see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 170 (1988); 
SIMON, supra note 19, at 21–25 (identifying “practical reason” with his fundamental 
lawyerly attribute, “contextual judgment”).  
 37 See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31; 
SIMON, supra note 19, at 123 (“Because such services depend on technical knowledge 
and resist standardization, they are not readily compatible with market or bureaucratic 
organization.”). 
 38 GROOPMAN, supra note 2, at 5 (noting the tension in medical practice 
between applying complex individual judgment and following detailed protocols). 
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measures as a means of cutting costs without corresponding fee reduc-
tions, thus improperly increasing their private gains.  In either case, 
capturing the proper measure of effort in a mathematically precise rule 
is quite problematic.
39
   
Excessive zeal presents a parallel problem in both fields: Just as it 
takes an expert to know when professional knowledge is being applied 
poorly on the client’s behalf, so it takes an expert to know whether 
that knowledge is being applied over-zealously, even maliciously, at 
the expense of the client’s opponent or the general public.  It is diffi-
cult to reduce the applicable standard to bright-line rules or protocols.  
The point, for example, at which a line of appropriately probing cross-
examination veers toward harassment of a witness is impossible to 
specify with Euclidian clarity, even though an expert may be able to 
mark it, in practice, to a single moment or to detect it in a steady but 
subtle undercurrent of tone.
40
  So, too, it may be apparent to any med-
ical expert which suspicious “lumps” are dark or hard or otherwise 
abnormal enough to require a further battery of tests, even though 
these factors may not be possible to state literally “on paper” in gener-
ally applicable protocols or guidelines.  
These considerations, according to functionalist theory, make it 
impossible for fungible state functionaries to measure professional 
performance by standardized, bureaucratic protocols.
41
  Professional 
practice must, instead, be evaluated by the professional cognoscenti 
themselves with inevitably hazily-stated, “know it when I see it” 
standards rather than “hard and fast,” bright-line rules.42  Such stand-
ards are doubly difficult: On the one hand, their very looseness leaves 
lots of wiggle-room for the incompetent or unscrupulous; on the other 
hand, that same vagueness may force the conscientious to be overly 
  
 39 The law has a generally effective means of addressing this problem, its 
ancient and honorable default to principles of equity as a corrective to the strict letter 
of the law or, in more modern terms, “standards” as an alternative to “rules.”  See, 
e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 559–64 (1992); see also RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 118 (2002) 
(discussing the tension between a “mechanical” jurisprudence and a discretionary 
one). But, as we will see later, neither the proponents of professionalism nor its de-
tractors have fully appreciated either this possibility or its relevant limitations. See 
infra Part II.B.  
 40 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010) (“In repre-
senting a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other 
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .”). 
 41 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31; 
SIMON, supra note 20, at 123 (“Because such services depend on technical knowledge 
and resist standardization, they are not readily compatible with market or bureaucratic 
organization.”).  
 42 See Atkinson, supra note 20, at 325. 
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cautious, doing sometimes more, sometimes less, than their best pro-
fessional judgment dictates, lest they incur legal penalties.
43
 
 
3. Professional Institutions as Superior  
Guarantors of Specialized Knowledge   
     
Professional knowledge, then, poses dual problems: With their 
limited grasp of matters within the special purview of professionals, 
consumers cannot guarantee proper professional service through pri-
vate contracts with suppliers; with its routine range of regulatory rem-
edies, the state can neither prevent professionals from exploiting those 
information asymmetries nor prevent clients and their professionals 
from externalizing costs.
44
  These two problems bring us to profes-
sionalism’s third and final claim: Only institutions internal to the pro-
fessions themselves can adequately guarantee proper acquisition and 
deployment of the relevant knowledge.  The cure for abuses by igno-
rant or unscrupulous individual practitioners, in other words, is regu-
lation by knowledgeable and conscientious professional groups.    
In the face of the two besetting sins we have identified, under-
competence (taking advantage of the clients’ relative ignorance) and 
externalities, (helping clients’ externalize costs upon third parties and 
the public), the professions claim to provide two distinct virtues.  The 
first involves placing the client’s interests above the professional’s 
own; the second, placing the public interest above the interests of both 
the client and the professional.
45
  In the words of Justice O’Connor, 
“One distinguishing feature of any profession . . . is that membership 
entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of econom-
ic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be en-
forced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the market.”46  
  
 43 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 20 (2010) (“Violation of a 
Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it 
create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”). 
 44 See id.  
 45 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 66 (1992) (“Good lawyers . . . must 
sometimes ignore their own self-interest, or the self-interest of their clients.”); SIMON, 
supra note 19, at 125 (noting that the self-regulatory regime of the “Progressive-
Functionalist project” enforced two basic norms, which “are primarily concerned with 
the adequacy of service to clients, and secondarily concerned with fairness to third 
parties”); see also ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, 
AND POLICY 200 (1994) (“The character of professional work suggests two basic 
elements of professionalism – commitment to practicing a body of knowledge and 
skill of special value and to maintaining a fiduciary relationship with clients.”). 
 46 Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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In functionalist theory, the organized, autonomous profession 
achieves proper deployment of professional knowledge through three 
basic means.  First, the profession inculcates a commitment to the 
core professional virtues, particularly in the course of professional 
education, which it therefore needs to control.
47
  Second, the profes-
sion denies admission into its ranks to those lacking in the relevant 
virtues, under its “character and fitness” requirements.48  Third, the 
profession maintains a system of sanctions, positive and negative, that 
encourages its members to practice the requisite virtues and eschew 
the corresponding vices, upon pain of penalties that range from colle-
gial reprimands to formal expulsion from the profession’s ranks.49  In 
combination, these professional institutions—education, admission, 
and regulation—ensure a level of performance above what consumers 
could obtain from any array of private contracts or public regulations.  
Or so the proponents of professionalism claim. 
 
4. Summary   
 
Functionalists claim that the necessarily discretionary application 
of professional knowledge presents difficulties of both ordinary mar-
ket provision and routine state regulation.  Relatively autonomous 
professional institutions are supposed to fill this double gap with spe-
cial professional virtues.  We will skeptically assess that claim in Part 
II; as we will see there, the claimed need for professional institutions 
proves rather too little.
50
  The case for the superiority of professional 
self-regulation over state regulation is, at best, badly focused.  The 
institutions of professionalism are neither necessary to guarantee the 
acquisition of professional knowledge nor sufficient to guarantee the 
exercise of professional virtue.  Before turning to those problems with 
functionalist theory, however, we need to focus on a more basic prob-
lem, in the other direction: The functionalist definition of specialized 
  
 47 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 94–95 
n.13. 
 48 See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 
YALE L.J. 491, 508 (1985). 
 49 See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 7 (2010) (In addi-
tion to the rules of professional conduct, “a lawyer is also guided by personal con-
science and the approbation of professional peers.”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (Although the lawyer is to be guided by both the 
Code and personal conscience, “in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and 
confidence of members of his profession and of the society with he serves that should 
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct” 
and “[t]he possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”). 
 50 See infra Part II. 
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professional knowledge tends to prove too much.  Many occupations 
other than the classic professions seem to involve the kind of 
knowledge that requires considerable discretion in its application, 
which should lead to the same kinds of market and regulatory failures.  
Functionalism must thus distinguish professional services from a wide 
array of services that seem to require equally esoteric knowledge and 
an analogous regulatory regime. 
 
B. Focusing the Functionalist Thesis: Narrowing the 
Field of Professional Knowledge 
 
A complex economy involves many forms of specialized 
knowledge, from computer programming to auto repair; most of us 
can neither acquire that knowledge for ourselves at reasonable cost 
nor adequately assess it in others.  To distinguish professionals from 
the wider range of those who provide these specialized knowledge-
based services, scholars of the professions draw two critical lines.  
The first separates artisans from technicians; the second separates 
technicians from professionals.  The requirement of university-based 
specialized education marks the first line; the necessary combination 
of university-based specialized education and university-based liberal 
education marks the second.  As we shall see, scholars of the profes-
sions have never drawn either line very clearly and have blurred the 
second quite badly.
51
 
 
1. The Line Between Artisans and Technicians: 
Distinguishing Informal from Formal      
Specialized Knowledge   
 
Functionalists concede that occupations other than professions al-
so involve specialized knowledge, and that that knowledge, in turn, 
requires a measure of discretion on the part of practitioners that is 
hard to restrain with black-letter laws.
52
  Remember Jerry Seinfeld and 
George Costanza’s despair about over-priced auto mechanics:  
 
George: Well, of course they’re trying to screw you.  What do you 
think?  That’s what they do.  They can make up anything.  Nobody 
  
 51 Notice that the line of university-based education is the one that Continen-
tal European countries tend to draw, without the further distinction of Anglo-
American law.  See Torstendahl, supra note 12, at 5.   
 52 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 32 (“[I]t 
is possible to delineate skilled work as a discretionary specialization based upon 
everyday and practical, but not necessarily formal knowledge.”).
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knows.  ‘By the way, you need a new Johnson rod in there.’  ‘Oh, a 
Johnson rod.  Yeah, well, you better put one of those on.’53    
 
Furthermore, many non-professional services entail not only in-
formation asymmetries, but also externalities.  If the providers of  
these non-professional services fail, it is not just consumers who will 
suffer, but also third parties, and sometimes more than in the case of 
improperly performed professional work.  A poorly drafted will may 
cost the client’s beneficiaries a fortune in the relatively distant future; 
a poor brake job on my pickup truck could easily cost both you and 
me our lives, later this very afternoon.  Yet we leave the latter situa-
tion to an essentially unregulated market in auto repair, reinforced 
post hoc by the tort system (assuming the injured party can afford a 
private lawyer).  If some combination of private market and govern-
ment regulation is adequate for other services that entail the applica-
tion  of esoteric knowledge, why not in putative professions like law 
and medicine, as well? 
How is putatively professional knowledge distinguishable from 
other esoteric knowledge that functionalist theory does not see as re-
quiring professional institutions?  If professional knowledge isn’t dis-
tinguishable, then functionalist defenders of the professions face a 
dilemma: Either, on the one hand, professionals need no more special 
occupational organization than other occupations providing equally 
complex and essential forms of knowledge, or, on the other hand, 
many more occupations qualify as professions than functionalist theo-
ry and social practice have acknowledged.  Thus functionalist theory 
should either “elevate” these other knowledge-based occupations into 
professional status, or reconsider the possibility that the classic pro-
fessional mode of organization could be replaced by some combina-
tion of governmental and market mechanisms.  Either way, the impli-
cation of this criticism is that functionalist theory proves too much.       
Functionalism has answered this over-breadth critique, although, 
as we shall see, that answer raises questions of its own.  Functionalists 
insist that the specialized knowledge of professionals is distinct from 
that of artisans and technicians in several related ways.  Most funda-
mentally, professional education requires a university foundation.
54
  
This critical distinction is already traceable in Brandeis’s century-old 
  
 53 Seinfeld: The Fusille Jerry (NBC television broadcast Apr. 27, 1995), 
script available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFusilliJerry htm (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2012).  See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 8. 
 54 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 123 
(“The professional school is where ethics is elaborated as well as taught and where 
that can be done somewhat independently of the market and the polity.”). 
2013]     MEDICINE AND LAW AS MODEL PROFESSIONS 369 
outline: “A profession is an occupation for which the necessary pre-
liminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and 
to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill.”55  Unlike 
craft training, which takes place largely in the workplace, and tech-
nical training, which “typically takes place in para-secondary and 
post-secondary institutions that are sometimes called technical insti-
tutes,”56 the ideal-type professional “school is attached to institutions 
of higher education.”57  What’s more, “in contrast to those involved in 
both craft and technical training, the faculty of the ideal-typical pro-
fessional school is expected not only to teach, but also to be active in 
the codification, refinement, and expansion of the occupation’s body 
of knowledge and skill by both theorizing and doing research.”58  
Thus “[t]he prestige that distinguishes the professions from the crafts 
stems from the connection of their training with higher education.”59 
Both medicine and law readily meet this first half of functional-
ism’s dual test. The specialized knowledge of physicians is literally 
proverbial: “The doctor’s knowledge gives him high standing and 
wins him the admiration of the great.”60  Even revisionist critics of 
medicine’s status as a profession concede that its practice is essential-
ly rooted in the advance of experimental sciences after the Enlighten-
ment.  These critics cite that scientific grounding as essential to medi-
cine’s success in obtaining and retaining a uniquely large measure of 
occupational autonomy and market control.
61
  This scientific 
knowledge is both inaccessible to laypeople and functionally related 
to providing a fundamental social value—individual physical health.  
And the scientific foundation of modern medical practice is itself 
based in the modern research university, as opposed to technical or 
occupational schools.
62
  As a result, medicine exhibits the kind of spe-
cialized knowledge required of an ideal-type profession.
63
 
  
 55 BRANDEIS, supra note 16, at 2. 
 56 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 91. 
 57 Id. at 92; see also LARSON, supra note 4, at 17 (“[T]he link between re-
search and training institutionalized by the modern model of university gives to uni-
versity-based professions the means to control their cognitive bases.”). 
 58 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 92. 
 59 Id. at 103.  See also LARSON, supra note 9, at 3 (“But the association with 
the university and, especially, the knowledge of Latin, distinguished the ‘learned’ 
professions from the craft guilds that developed in the towns between the eleventh 
and the thirteenth century.”). 
 60 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: THE WISDOM OF BEN SIRA § 38:3 (Patrick W. Skehan 
trans., 1987). 
 61 See LARSON, supra note 4, at 34, 36. 
 62 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 185. 
 63 We can take it as proved because it actually is proved or, more stingily, 
because, even if it is proved, its essential link with general knowledge cannot be 
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So, too, with the law.  The need for inter-disciplinary education is 
apparent, even in simple, first-year curriculum cases like Hawkins v. 
McGee.  At least since the time of Learned Hand’s famous standard of 
negligence,
64
 lawyers and judges have recognized that determining 
liability for non-contractual damages necessarily involves both 
cost/benefit analysis and risk calculation.  In more complex cases, the 
interdisciplinary foundation of modern law is even more apparent.  
The structuring of mass torts, for example, implicates not only eco-
nomics, but also sociology, psychology, and political and moral phi-
losophy,
65
 all university-based academic disciplines.  These two ex-
amples come from private law; the academic foundations of public 
law are even more obvious.  As Judge Posner points out, “[i]t is fair to 
say that at the beginning of its second century antitrust law has be-
come a branch of applied economics . . . .”66  And so, too, “adminis-
trative law scholarship . . . draws more on economics and political 
science than on law [traditionally defined].”67  Private law itself is 
now seen to rest ultimately on the same foundations as public law;
68
 
modern law, private and public, is thus thoroughly grounded in ad-
vanced, university-based studies in the social sciences and humanities. 
Both doctors and lawyers, then, can be shown to need a special-
ized knowledge that is not only beyond the ken of layfolk, but also 
grounded in the university.  That grounding of both medicine and law 
in the university takes care of Seinfeld and Costanza’s auto mechanic 
(at least for now); knowledge of the Johnson rod may indeed be im-
portant and esoteric, and there may be a certain “zen” about all vehic-
ular maintenance, automobile as well as motorcycle.  But mechanics 
do not acquire either that knowledge or that skill in college, and its 
foundations do not lie in university-based research.  Thus it is not 
merely, as one prominent scholar of professionalism has suggested, 
that “[p]eople don’t want to call automobile repair a profession be-
cause they don’t want to accord it that dignity.”
 69 
 
  
proved, as we shall see.  Since these requirements are conjuncts, both are needed to 
make the case for medicine as a proper profession; if medicine fails to meet one of 
them, it fails the entire test. 
 64 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 65 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and 
Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 91 (2011). 
 66 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
229 (1999). 
 67 Id. at 237. 
 68 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN, at vii-viii (1985). 
 69 Cf. ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 8. 
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2. The Line Between Technicians and Profes-
sionals: Connecting Formal Occupational 
Knowledge and General Cultural Knowledge 
 
Even as the identification of university-based education essential 
to medicine and law promises to distinguish these paradigmatic pro-
fessions from “crafts,” it poses another problem.  It leaves a large and 
growing number of occupations on the professional side of the line: 
accounting, engineering, and business management, for example.  As 
Louis Brandeis pointed out, business management is the subject of 
highly esoteric bodies of knowledge, in several quite disparate disci-
plines in both the physical and social sciences,
70
 and it is taught at the 
university level.
71
  
To distinguish such occupations as these, theorists of the profes-
sions point to a distinction traditionally drawn by the professions 
themselves.  Professions do not merely involve a university-based 
theoretical foundation of their teachers; they also require a more 
broad-based liberal education on the part of their students and practi-
tioners.  Thus, according to Freidson, 
 
The ideology of professionalism asserts knowledge that is not 
merely the narrow depth of the technician, or the shallow breadth of 
a generalist, but rather a wedding of the two in a unique marriage.  
This wedding of liberal education to specialized training qualifies 
professionals to be more than mere technicians.  It qualifies them to 
serve in managerial positions where they can establish policy as 
well as organize and control their own work and the work of their 
colleagues independently of both managers and consumers.  By 
grounding a functionally specific specialization in the advanced, 
elite generalism that provides executives and politicians with a 
mandate to command consumers, subjects, and citizens, the profes-
sional ideology creates a basis for claiming legitimacy that goes be-
yond the technical.
72
 
 
And this elite generalism, according to Friedson, “provides or re-
quires prior exposure to high culture.”73 
But outlining the basis for professions’ claim to a kind of esoteric 
knowledge above the merely technical simply raises another question: 
Is that foundation substantial enough to sustain the edifice that has 
  
 70 BRANDEIS, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 71 See id. at 1 (“The establishment of business schools in our universities is a 
manifestation of the modern conception of business [as a profession].”). 
 72 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121. 
 73 Id. 
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been erected upon it?  To put the question in functionalism’s own 
terms: Is this university-based training in the liberal arts as well as in a 
particular occupational specialty functionally related to professionals’ 
performance of their socially necessary and knowledge-based tasks?   
Revisionist critics of functionalism have a ready response: no.  
Liberal education of professionals is a pseudo-necessity, either anoth-
er costly and artificial barrier to entry,
74
 or simply a high-status con-
sumption item or social ornament.
75
  The real function of the require-
ment is thus to dominate the market for certain services, either by 
restricting supply of qualified practitioners or by creating demand for 
what amounts to little more than mystifying pseudo-science.
76
  As 
even the leading defender of professionalism concedes, the profes-
sions may cloak themselves in the status-enhancing allure of universi-
ty education because it associates them, in various ways, with power-
ful elites.
77
  
To answer these criticisms and defensibly distinguish the profes-
sions from other occupations that rely on university-based technical 
  
 74 See, e.g., FRITZ K. RINGER, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN MODERN EUROPE 
21 (1979) (“[T]he ability to do without any particular competence was clearly honor-
ific . . . suggest[ing] the power to direct others, as against having to be useful and 
usable oneself.”); RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL 
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 189 (1979) (“It has been by the use of 
educational credentials that the lucrative professions have closed their ranks and 
upgraded their salaries, and it has been in imitation of their methods that other occu-
pations have ‘professionalized.’”); LARSON, supra note 4, at 87 (“Social qualifications 
became the first requirement for membership, and it was held that the necessary 
‘morals and manners’ could be learnt only at the universities.”) (quoting A.M. CARR-
SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 71 (1933)).  Id. at 89 (“The classics . . . 
served the professions in a different way: as the intellectual sanction which Oxford 
and Cambridge bestowed upon the gentry’s hegemony, a classical education func-
tioned as a gate-keeping mechanism for the most prestigious professional roles.”); see 
also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (finding it inappropriate to 
require higher education of employees when their job performance does not require 
that education and when that requirement tends to exclude minority applicants). 
 75 See COLLINS, supra note 74, at vii (“‘The old requirements of a knightly 
style of life . . . is nowadays in Germany replaced by the necessity of participating in 
its surviving remnants, the dueling fraternities of the universities which grant the 
patents of education; in the Anglo-Saxon countries by the athletic and social clubs 
that fulfill the same function.’”) (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN 
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY, VOLUME 2, at 1000 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich, eds., University of California Press 1978)). 
 76 See LARSON, supra note 4, at 48; Abel, supra note 14, at 187. 
 77 FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 103–04.  
See also ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 137 (describing the professional strategy of “draw-
ing power from without” though “alliance with a particular social class, a strategy 
usually preferred by elite professions”:  “In such a case, a profession draws both its 
recruits and its clients from the upper classes, locates its training in the elite universi-
ties or similar settings, and affects an ethic of stringent gentlemanliness.”). 
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knowledge, proponents of professionalism must establish a necessary 
link between technical professional knowledge and a university-level 
education in the liberal arts.  This case, we shall see in the next sec-
tion, can be made for the practice of law, but the case for the practice 
of medicine is a very different matter. 
 
C. Finding the Crucial Link with Liberal Learning 
 
To distinguish the professions from other occupations that deploy 
university-based bodies of knowledge, functionalist sociologists have 
identified an additional kind of knowledge that professionals need: the 
kind of generalist knowledge associated with a liberal, not just a uni-
versity, education.  As we have seen, however, functionalism has been 
more than a little vague about what this link is, and what function it 
serves.  Without more precision on this point, functionalism leaves 
itself open to the revisionist charge that this asserted link is really a 
distinction without a difference, a makeweight that serves the interest 
of the occupation rather than its consumers or the public.     
Into that gap in functionalist theory this section brings both good 
news and bad.  The good news is that a closer analysis of the legal 
profession shows that it entails exactly the kind of hybrid general and 
specialized knowledge that functionalism is looking for.  The bad 
news is that no such link is to be found in the practice of medicine.  
We begin, accordingly, by considering law as a paradigm of this kind 
of knowledge, the better to notice its apparent absence in the practice 
of medicine. 
 
1. The Law and Liberal Learning 
 
To see why lawyers need this special hybrid knowledge, let’s re-
consider our medical malpractice example.  We noticed that the 
standard of tort liability, as currently understood in the law, implicates 
the kind of economic analysis that is based in university economics 
departments.
78
  This link and others like it, according to functionalist 
theory, distinguishes the lawyer’s specialized knowledge from that of 
the automobile mechanic or even the master artisan.   
It does not, however, distinguish lawyers from actuaries.
79
  Their 
grounding in university-based economic theory is at least as clear as 
that of lawyers; quite likely, the typical actuary will need a much 
more sophisticated appreciation of economics than the average law-
  
 78 See supra Part I.A.  
 79 See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 235–38 (examining the partial professionali-
zation of statisticians, quality controllers, and operations researchers). 
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yer.  Thus, the critical distinction between actuaries and lawyers must 
lie elsewhere.  On the functionalist argument, it lies in the lawyer’s 
wedding of specialized, university-based knowledge with general, 
liberal learning.   
And so, indeed, it does.  This linkage becomes clear if we imagine 
the aftermath of the Hawkins case from the perspective of a lawyer 
representing Dr. McGee’s malpractice insurance carrier.  Suppose 
that, having lost the Hawkins case under the existing standard of care, 
the medical malpractice insurer asks for help dealing with a more 
general problem: burgeoning medical malpractice claims.  What the 
insurance company wants now, in other words, is “tort reform.” 
Although this issue could have come up in the trial itself,
80
 the 
setting for seeking such legal change would more likely be either ad-
ministrative or legislative.
81
  More ambitiously, the insurance compa-
ny might seek federal preemption of state standards or some other 
sweeping “tort reform” plan; more mundanely, it might merely apply 
for an increase in permitted premiums to cover expanding liability 
under the existing regime.   
At each of these levels, one thing is clear: the lawyer’s argument 
for the insurance company cannot be that the proposed change is good 
for just that company, or for the insurance industry as a whole, or 
even for American companies generally.  The insurance company 
must argue that its proposal is good for society at large.  So it was 
with all the recent bail-outs: the banks, GM and the automobile indus-
try, and AIG.
82
  Corporate lawyers cannot prevail in these settings 
based on corporate profitability or even broader business interests.  
They must invoke some other standard because the relevant decision-
makers—legislatures, administrative agencies, and ultimately the 
  
 80 Dr. Hawkins’s lawyer could have argued, not that the doctor’s particular 
level of care was appropriate, but that the level of care itself was inappropriate.  This 
is not, however, a particularly flattering portrayal of the doctor himself, nor is it likely 
to be his best defense. 
 81 This is not to deny, of course, that “test cases” are both an important and 
legitimate instrument for legal change.  See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights 
Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 795, 837 (1989); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11 (recognizing the legitimacy of litigation based on arguments for the modifica-
tion, extension, or reversal of existing law). 
 82 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008) (“To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and 
insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and 
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, 
and for other purposes.”). 
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courts—have protection of the public interest as their constitutional 
mission.
83
  
This is the central point: to argue for any change in the law, the 
insurance company’s lawyers, qua lawyers, must engage in the dis-
course of public interest, as distinct from their client’s particular inter-
ests.  The lawyer cannot simply argue that the change in law would be 
good for the client; the lawyer must also argue that the change in law 
would be good for the public as well.  To serve their client’s interest, 
the insurance company’s lawyers must be able to speak in terms that 
transcend both what is technically legal under current law and what is 
in the client’s own interest. 
This brings us to the larger point.  Law is ultimately grounded in 
claims of justice, and justice invariably involves resolving conflicts of 
particular interests consistently with the public interest.  Law’s origin 
as a profession precisely coincided with the need of European mon-
archs for just such an occupation and the offering of legal training in 
the earliest European universities (with England as a notable excep-
tion).
84
  As a matter of basic competence, then, at least some lawyers 
must know how to make public-benefit based arguments.
85
 
Thus, when we examine a basic element of the lawyer’s role—
arguing on behalf of private clients for changes in the law—we dis-
cover that they need precisely the combination of technical and gen-
eral knowledge that functionalists say the ideal-type profession re-
  
 83 This is reflected, perhaps most basically, in the minimum scrutiny applied 
to garden-variety economic and social legislation after United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938): All legislation must at least offer a min-
imally reasonable prospect of advancing a legitimate state interest. 
 84 No one makes this point better than Larson, hardly an apologist for the 
traditional claims of professionalism:  
 
In continental Europe, the development and the codification of the law had 
coincided with the multiplication of the universities in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.  In Italy especially, but also in some French universi-
ties, the demand for lawyers and administrators led to notable develop-
ments in civil and canon law.  In England, the civil courts had resisted the 
introduction of the Roman Code and created, instead, a native common 
law, considered much too coarse and plebeian to be a fit subject of univer-
sity teaching. 
 
LARSON, supra note 4, at 85 (citation omitted). 
 85 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 13 (2010) (“Law-
yers [as guardians of the law] play a vital role in the preservation of society.  The 
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship [with 
and function in] our legal system.”).  The bracketed language is from the otherwise 
identical provision of the Preamble of the A.B.A.’s 1969 Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980).  
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quires.  In order to argue for changes in the law that are in their cli-
ents’ interests, they must be able to make the case that those changes 
are in the public interest, too, that what is good for GM really is good 
for the country.  And, in order to make these arguments, they must be 
able to identify and balance core social values.  On this process rests 
the legal profession’s best claim to require a foundation of university-
level liberal learning.  Here we have an account that both links the 
technical with the liberal arts in legal education and shows how the 
practice of law necessarily implicates that link. 
 
2. The Missing Link Between the Practice of 
Medicine and the Application of Liberal 
Learning 
 
In Part I.A, we saw that the essential element of an ideal-type pro-
fession is provision of a service that, on account of the specialized 
knowledge it entails, must be regulated by an essentially autonomous 
occupation.  In Part I.B, we saw that that the specialized knowledge 
that distinguishes professions from other knowledge-based occupa-
tions must be generated and conveyed in a research-oriented universi-
ty and must be functionally related to the kind of general knowledge 
included in a liberal arts education.  The practice of law, we saw in 
Part I.C.1, offers a paradigm of just this sort of knowledge-based oc-
cupation.  By contrast, as we shall see in the rest of Part I.C, the prac-
tice of medicine, long the paradigmatic learned profession, lacks pre-
cisely the link between technical knowledge and liberal education 
needed to make a profession “learned” in the relevant way. 
As a start, let’s compare the role of medical and legal experts in 
the example that we just considered, changing the standard of care 
relevant to doctors.  Doctors’ specialized knowledge would, of course, 
be essential to making that case.  Only medical experts could supply 
necessary data about what results various procedures are likely to pro-
duce, at what costs, and at what risks.  But those are only the empiri-
cal predicates to answering the ultimate question, what the appropriate 
standard of care should be.  Actually answering that question involves 
not just knowing what to do to achieve a particular result, but also 
whether the cost of doing that is warranted when compared with other 
considerations.   It is making the case for just such decisions that re-
quires lawyers to rely, not only on a specialized knowledge of law as a 
body of rules and procedures, but also on the kind of general apprecia-
tion of social values that is the core of both a liberal arts education and 
law understood more broadly as a system for the rational resolution of 
disputes over just such values—law understood as judges understand 
it, as a “system of justice.”    
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As we have seen, competent delivery of a wide range of legal ser-
vices requires just such knowledge; lawyers must be able to ground 
client claims in the public interest.  To do this, they must be able to 
articulate the shared values that are said to form the public interest.  
Knowledge of these shared values can only be obtained from a liberal 
education.  
By contrast, it is difficult to see why a medical doctor would need 
a deep appreciation of such values in order to deliver competent med-
ical care.  Doctors, to be sure, need to know that health is a value, but 
they could presumably either infer the value of health from the fact 
that consumers are willing and able to pay for it or accept its value as 
a “given” of our legal and social systems more generally.  With re-
spect to other social values, doctors need know even less.  The Hippo-
cratic Oath itself implies that all doctors need to know about other 
values is that doctors are always to subordinate the pursuit of those 
values to that of the individual patient’s health.86  Someone, of course, 
needs to know why this subordination is appropriate, but it need not 
include all doctors (and could conceivably include no doctors).  By 
contrast, to the extent that this subordination is legally binding, part of 
the minimally acceptable level of medical care, at least some lawyers 
would need to understand it: those who would effectively argue that 
the client-first standard has been met in a particular case, or needs to 
be changed across the board.  
And we can see this same distinction between doctors and lawyers 
much more broadly, in the general debate over how health care is to 
be weighed against other social values.  In a purely market economy, 
consumers alone would decide how to weigh health care against other 
social values. They would budget for health care according to two 
considerations, willingness and ability to pay: how much they could 
afford to pay for that service, and how much they value it relative to 
other goods and services they might purchase instead.  In this purely 
laissez-faire system, doctors would certainly convey esoteric infor-
mation to consumers about how healthy they are, and what they would 
need to stay that healthy or get healthier.  That would be the essence 
of the service they provide; they would fail to provide it at peril of 
malpractice liability, loss of licensure, and other legal penalties.   
But the doctor’s service would include no essential role—and, un-
less asked, perhaps no proper role—in advising patients whether to 
value a given level of health higher or lower than anything else (e.g., a 
given level of pastry or tobacco consumption or, for that matter, dona-
  
 86 Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today html. 
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tions for the benefit of those who cannot afford basic health care).  
This is emphatically not to say that social values are not in the balance 
when one decides whether to undergo a tummy-tuck or send one’s 
plastic surgeon off to a Third World country to mend a child’s cleft 
palate.  It is just to say that, in weighing these alternatives, the opinion 
of one’s doctor, as a doctor, is professionally irrelevant.  Or, to put the 
point a bit more precisely, the opinion of one’s doctor could be made 
irrelevant, legally or functionally, without undermining that doctor’s 
delivery of optimal medical care.     
No modern health-care system, of course, operates on so purely a 
market model, with medical services allocated strictly on the basis of 
individual patients’ willingness and ability to pay.  We not only regu-
late to ensure that patients get the kind of treatment they are paying 
for, we also redistribute wealth, in various ways, to make sure that 
some people receive at least some treatments they want but cannot 
afford.
87
  And the law sometimes intrudes even more into individuals’ 
consumption of medical care, by overriding an unwillingness to pay.  
The government sometimes mandates that people receive medical care 
that they can readily afford but would emphatically refuse.  The para-
digm of this today, of course, is mandatory vaccination;
88
 not too long 
ago, it was mandatory sterilization.
89
  And, conversely, the law some-
times forbids medical procedures that some are willing and able to 
pay for: extremely late-term abortions today;
90
 virtually all abortions 
in the recent past
91
 (and, perhaps, in the near future).
92
 
All these examples, of course, involve the weighing of health-care 
costs and benefits against each other and against competing social 
  
 87 Medicaid and Medicare are, of course, the prime American examples; 
some countries have much more extensively subsidized health-care provision.  See 
EINER ELHAUGE, THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE 3–4 (2010). 
 88 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–27 (1905); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–70 (1944). 
 89 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
 90 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 541 (1989) (“[T]he 
State may not fully regulate abortion in the interest of potential life (as opposed to 
maternal health) until the third trimester . . . .”). 
 91 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973) (listing the following states as 
having laws limiting abortions: Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming). 
 92 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the ruling upholding the partial-birth abortion ban was an “alarming” one 
that ignored Supreme Court precedent and “refuse[d] to take Casey and Stenberg 
seriously”). 
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values.  And all these examples necessarily implicate knowledge that 
only the medically trained can provide: the technical feasibility of 
various therapies and procedures, perhaps the relative costs and effec-
tiveness of various alternatives.  But, once that data is in, we do not 
need doctors, qua doctors, to help us weigh it.  That balancing of val-
ues is not, strictly speaking, a medical decision.  It will, by contrast, 
always be a legal decision: what to fund, what to allow, what to re-
quire, what to forbid.      
Consider a recent but already classic case, the much-discussed 
“death panels” of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act.93  The 
function of those panels, contrary to the rumors, was not to decide 
whether to save particular individuals or to let them die.  Instead, their 
function was to give the terminally ill the basis on which to make an 
informed decision about whether or not to elect potentially life-
prolonging treatment.  On any such panel, doctors would surely have 
a place, to explain what the relevant treatment options were, in terms 
of their likely success, side-effects, quality of life, and costs.  Some-
one other than a doctor might deliver that information, but its ultimate 
source would have to be someone trained in the science of medicine 
itself.  But, to the extent that the patient wanted to know what he or 
she should do, whether he or she should elect a given therapy or any 
treatment option at all, the doctor, qua doctor, need have no role.  
Such counseling could be given by someone specially trained to 
weigh such values, quite possibly someone of the patient’s own reli-
gious or political faith.  That person would be, in essence, a kind of 
chaplain; that kind of chaplain need not be any kind of medical doc-
tor.         
The same is potentially true, if less politically dramatic, in the 
case of all end of life decisions.  The law has long since removed  
these decisions from the unilateral discretion of doctors; doctors now 
“play God” in that sense only at the peril of malpractice liability, loss 
of licensure, or even conviction for homicide.
94
  The role of the doc-
tor, qua doctor, is now to diagnose terminal illness, inform the patient, 
and identify possible modes of treatment.  But the choice of treatment, 
though often not the patient’s alone, need never be the doctor’s at 
all.
95
  You can, of course, ask your doctor for his or her opinion about 
whether you should pursue a life-extending course of treatment, but 
that opinion would be personal, not professional.  Again, we can 
  
 93 See Robert Pear, Obama Institutes End-of-Life Plan that Caused Stir, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at A1. 
 94 People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (finding 
consent and euthanasia were not viable defenses in Kevorkian’s murder prosecution). 
 95 FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 318–19. 
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structure the delivery of health care in a way that makes the doctor’s 
rendering of that opinion unnecessary to the delivery of medical care. 
Nor is this distinction merely theoretical; the Supreme Court’s 
abortion cases have effectively written it into constitutional law.  To 
see how this is so, consider two landmark Supreme Court cases, Roe 
v. Wade
96
 and Rust v. Sullivan.
97
  The former, of course, affirmed a 
woman’s basic constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy with a 
doctor’s assistance.  The latter upheld a federal regulation that forbids 
doctors in federally-funded family planning clinics from giving advice 
about non-therapeutic abortions.  Opponents of the regulatory prohibi-
tion argued that it unconstitutionally interferes with patients’ right to 
have non-therapeutic abortions, in effect overturning Roe v. Wade.  In 
analyzing this challenge, the members of the court isolated a distinc-
tion at the core of our analysis: therapeutic as opposed to non-
therapeutic advice.   
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, nicely set out the critical premises of 
the challenge to the regulatory ban: “In our society, the doctor-patient 
dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust.  The specialized 
nature of medical science and the emotional distress often attendant to 
health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete 
confidence, and often their very lives, in the hands of medical profes-
sionals.”98  
This, as we shall examine in detail later, eloquently states the core 
of the case for medicine as a caring profession.
99
  As Blackmun  
points out, the majority itself was careful to note that the regulation in 
question did not impinge upon doctors’ delivery of health-related ad-
vice, specifically, advice about therapeutic abortions.
100
  And both 
Blackmun and the majority noted that earlier Supreme Court decisions 
had struck down laws forbidding all doctors to discuss abortions even 
in cases where the patient’s physical health was at stake.101   
But Justice Blackmun’s next assertion, which tried to link protect-
ed therapeutic advice with the non-therapeutic advice at issue in Rust, 
is a normative non sequitur that the majority refused to write into con-
stitutional law:  “One seeks a physician’s aid not only for medication 
or diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional judgment, and vital 
emotional support. Accordingly, each of us attaches profound im-
  
 96 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 97 500 U.S. 173 (1990). 
 98 Id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 99 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 100 Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 101 Id.; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988). 
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portance and authority to the words of advice spoken by the physi-
cian.”102 
As an empirical matter, this second assertion may well be true; 
many of us may often rely on our doctors for just such non-medical 
advice.  But this latter form of advice can be separated, both logically 
and legally, from advice that is purely diagnostic and therapeutic.  
That separation, in essence, is precisely what the Supreme Court ma-
jority recognized in upholding the regulation: the Constitution protects 
therapeutic advice about abortions much more strongly than non-
therapeutic advice. 
We do not know, except along that rather extreme frontier, how 
the constitutional rights of patients shape the content of the doctor-
patient relationship.  But we do know enough to make several im-
portant observations.  First, both the Rust majority and Blackmun’s 
dissent treat the diagnostic and therapeutic function of doctors as very 
socially significant; in the case of pregnant women, that function is so 
closely related to a fundamental legal right as to enjoy constitutional 
protection.  Second, the majority in Rust was unwilling to extend that 
constitutional protection, on the facts before it, to doctors’ more gen-
eral, non-therapeutic counseling, even when that counseling would 
involve discussions of the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right, reproductive autonomy.  Third, in deciding what elements of the 
doctor-patient relationship are subject to legislative regulation, and to 
what extent, it is members of the legal profession, not the medical 
profession, who decide.   
Again, in making decisions like these, members of the legal pro-
fession—not only judges, but also the lawyers who prepare such cas-
es—must be able to draw on the most basic sources of our shared so-
cial values.  And so in Roe v. Wade itself, Blackmun, writing then for 
the Court’s majority, reviewed the history of abortion in Western cul-
ture all the way back to the classics and the scriptures.
103
  Nothing 
could more nicely make the point we need to see here.  The Supreme 
Court recognizes the importance of the service that doctors alone have 
the knowledge to provide.  But protection of the right to receive what 
doctors alone can provide is conferred only by our courts, and only on 
the basis of their knowledge of the deepest norms of our culture. 
Having an abortion may sometimes literally save a woman’s life, 
as a medical matter; having either an abortion or a baby may very well 
ruin her life, as a moral or psychological matter.  Roe forbids the 
elected branches of government from depriving a woman of medical 
  
 102 Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 103 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–36 (1973).   
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advice, even medical assistance, in the first matter; Rust allows those 
branches to deny her medical advice on the second matter when that 
advice would be publicly funded.  The point for us to see is, again, 
that therapeutic and non-therapeutic advice about even the most fun-
damental medical matters can be, and often are, separated, in law as 
well as in logic. 
Consider a possible exception that helps clarify, if not prove, that 
rule: weighing an individual patient’s good against public cost, espe-
cially where that cost is being borne by third parties.  Let’s assume 
that we want doctors to make these calls in individual cases, under 
more or less strict guidelines.  What they would need to know is the 
reason for the balancing, not the public good more broadly conceived.  
They might need to know how to strike the balance between benefits 
and costs to individual patients, on the one hand, and the benefits and 
costs to the public, on the other.  But they would not need to know, 
beyond that, how these balances are struck, or why.  They would not 
need to know, for example, the classic debates over the good of the 
few versus the good of the many.
104
  These decisions are, ultimately, 
for the popular branches of government, subject to constitutional re-
view by the courts. 
As the examples in this section remind us, many decisions about 
health care, public as well as private, implicate the most profound 
balancing of social values we can imagine: who we as a society decide 
to save by providing subsidized health care, and who we are willing to 
watch die without it; whose most profoundly held religious beliefs 
must yield to the interests of others and to the common good.  But 
neither these value choices nor advice about how to make them is part 
of the services that physicians, as physicians, provide.  Although we 
must look to doctors for the technical medical expertise necessary for 
making all these decisions, we do not need to look to doctors for the 
weighing of social values in any of these decisions.  What is more, it 
is not clear why we would ever need doctors, in the delivery of routine 
health-care services, to appreciate fundamental social values or to help 
us resolve conflicts among them.  And so it seems that the asserted 
link between specialized medical knowledge and a general liberal 
education is, at best, not proved.   
If so, then the practice of medicine cannot be, as it is generally as-
sumed to be, the prime example of the ideal-type profession, an occu-
pation that essentially weds specialized technical knowledge with 
general cultural knowledge in the provision of an essential social ser-
  
 104 See J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST 30–31 (1973). 
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vice.  If medicine is to sustain its claim to a distinctive professional 
status, it must rest that claim on something else.  As we shall see in 
Part II, it has just such a claim, founded on the particular kind of care 
we need doctors to take when they apply their specialized occupation-
al knowledge in serving patients.  What is more, recognition of that 
claim points to a significant refinement in our understanding, not only 
of medicine as a profession, but also of professions more generally. 
 
II. TOWARD A REFINED FUNCTIONALIST UNDERSTANDING OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 
 
This Part takes up the two basic questions posed in Part I: What, if 
anything, makes the practice of medicine a profession, and what effect 
does relocating the basis of professionalism in medicine have on our 
understanding of professionalism generally?    To get at the first ques-
tion, Part II.A begins by looking back at what makes law distinctive.  
It is not, we shall see, law’s distinctive kind of knowledge alone, but 
rather the failure of the market to deliver that knowledge optimally, 
even with regulatory correctives.  With that insight, we can then iso-
late a similar distinction about medicine.  The state and the market can 
guarantee the necessary knowledge; what they cannot guarantee is the 
professional virtue necessary to apply that knowledge optimally.  For 
that, we need the special institutions of the professions themselves.  
When we turn to those institutions in Part II.B, however, we dis-
cover a paradox for both law and medicine: The very kind of virtue 
we need to ensure proper delivery of professional knowledge in both 
occupations cannot be guaranteed by professional institutions as tradi-
tionally conceived.  Those institutions critically rely upon the coercive 
power of the state to exclude from the market those practitioners lack-
ing the relevant professional attributes.  But the kind of professional 
virtues we identify as essential attributes of law and medicine, respec-
tively, cannot be regulated by the rules of professions any better than 
by the laws of the state. When the professions try to root out profes-
sional vices with the coercive power of law, they run into the same 
problems as government regulators. 
These two insights—the unique importance of the virtue of care in 
medical practice and the difficulty of ensuring that virtue—take us in 
Part II.C to a refined understanding of what conditions make profes-
sions necessary, and how the professions might meet those conditions.  
And that understanding gives us a new ideal-type profession with two 
distinctive branches, the public professions like law and the caring 
professions like medicine. 
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A. Professional Knowledge and Professional Virtue: 
Re-Mapping Their Proper Relationship   
 
We saw in Part I that the practice of law, unlike the practice of 
medicine, requires general knowledge of the public good as well as 
particular occupational knowledge.  From this it is tempting to draw 
two related conclusions, both deeply erroneous: first, that this hybrid 
knowledge is somehow the essence of professional status; second, that 
requiring this knowledge makes law a proper profession, even as med-
icine’s lacking it means that medicine is not.  A closer look at the le-
gal profession’s hybrid of general and specialized knowledge will 
point us to the common factor that makes both medicine and law 
proper professions, although of significantly different kinds. 
 
1. The Locus of Virtue in Public-Protecting 
Professions 
 
Let’s return, then, to our examples of why lawyers must deploy 
general knowledge of the public good as well as the technical 
knowledge of their particular occupation.
105
   Those examples showed 
that, to make the case for legal changes favoring their clients— 
bailouts for banks and automobile companies, more favorable liability 
rules for medical insurance providers—lawyers have to be able to 
argue that these changes would benefit the public as well as their cli-
ents.  Lawyers, again, have to lend at least plausibility to the claim 
that what’s good for GM is good for the country.   
Here we need to notice something else about that lawyerly de-
ployment of general and special knowledge on behalf of private cli-
ents: It may very well be possible to guarantee its deployment to the 
satisfaction of those clients themselves without any need for special 
professional institutions.  That knowledge is, as we have seen, quite 
outside the scope of the ordinary consumer, and lawyers, left to their 
own devices, might well exploit this information asymmetry.  But, we 
should note here, corporate managers are not ordinary consumers; 
some of them are lawyers themselves.  Thus the esoteric knowledge of 
lawyers may be well within the scope of their corporate clients, whose 
management includes lawyers like the ones they are hiring.  Indeed, a 
principal function of in-house counsel today is to select and monitor 
effective outside counsel.
106
  And, of course, in-house counsel and 
  
 105 See supra Part I.C.1. 
 106 See Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying 
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011). 
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their corporate employers have every incentive to hire lawyers with 
the requisite knowledge.    
On the other hand, not all lawyers who must make public-
regarding arguments on behalf of private clients work for sophisticat-
ed corporate managers.  Some work for individual clients who may 
well not be in a position to determine whether their lawyers have this 
knowledge, or whether they are deploying it as they should.  Think, 
again, of the plaintiffs in Hawkins v. McGee and Roe v. Wade.  Here 
the risk of lawyers’ exploiting information asymmetries is very real.  
It is not clear, however, why the state could not mandate that lawyers 
have this knowledge as a condition of being licensed and police their 
application of this knowledge in practice.   
We need not answer that question here;
107
 what we need to see 
now is how different matters stand with respect to another problem 
lawyerly knowledge presents, that of externalities.  In both of the situ-
ations we have re-examined thus far, those involving sophisticated as 
well as unsophisticated clients, we have focused only on information 
asymmetries, the clients’ difficulty in ensuring that the lawyer does 
not trade on superior knowledge to underserve the client.  Even if 
standard regulatory measures could address that problem, that would 
leave another, analytically distinct problem, which we identified earli-
er: excessive zeal.
108
 
Here, remember, the problem is not doing too little for a client, 
but doing too much; not the lawyer’s exploiting the unknowing client, 
but the lawyer’s advancing client interests at the expense of third par-
ties or the public.  Preventing this, I have argued elsewhere,
109
 is be-
yond the capacity of both the state and the market.  The market actual-
ly exacerbates the problem; more knowing clients are all too eager to 
reward lawyers who subordinate the public interest to particular client 
interests.  And the regulatory regime of the state cannot adequately 
address this, since it involves mandating a commitment to the public 
good that would be difficult to define and impossible to police, if not 
unconstitutional to impose. 
The point to see for present purposes is this: What makes a law-
yer’s necessary knowledge special is not content alone—its distinctive 
combination of general and specialized knowledge—but also the dif-
ficulty of ensuring the optimal deployment of that knowledge by any 
combination of market and state mechanisms.  If we focus on the dif-
ferences between lawyerly knowledge and medical knowledge, we 
risk overlooking the possibility that the two occupations share a much 
  
 107 I have examined it in detail elsewhere.  See Atkinson, supra note 6.  
 108 See supra Part I.A.1.b.ii. 
 109 Atkinson, supra note 6. 
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more significant similarity.  There may well be aspects of medical 
knowledge that make its delivery, like the delivery of legal 
knowledge, impossible for the market and the state adequately to 
guarantee. 
 
2. The Locus of Virtue in Principal-Protecting 
Professions 
 
Here again, Justice Blackmun’s sketch of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship is particularly instructive.  As we saw in Part I, that sketch 
nicely distinguishes between the physician’s therapeutic and counsel-
ing roles.
110
  There we saw that the counseling role, the role that might 
well entail liberal learning, can be separated, both functionally and 
analytically, from the physician’s therapeutic role.  Here we need to 
focus on what Justice Blackmun says about the therapeutic role itself, 
the role that we have identified as the core of the physician’s function: 
“In our society, the doctor-patient dialogue embodies a unique rela-
tionship of trust.  The specialized nature of medical science and the 
emotional distress often attendant to health-related decisions requires 
that patients place their complete confidence, and often their very 
lives, in the hands of medical professionals.”111 
As Justice Blackmun suggests, what is distinctive about the prac-
tice of medicine is less the esoteric content of medical knowledge, and 
more the configuration of factors that shape its delivery.
112
     
As we have seen, the practice of medicine requires knowledge 
that is doubly removed from the everyday: it is not only beyond the 
ken of those for whom it is applied, it is also advanced and transmitted 
in research universities.
113
  Application of this knowledge thus creates 
an information asymmetry that practitioners could abuse, and, because 
application of this knowledge also involves the exercise of judgment 
in complex situations, it is difficult to monitor by bureaucratic proto-
cols.  But, as we have also seen, these conditions apply to the tech-
nical work of many occupations not traditionally recognized as pro-
fessions.  What (if anything) makes medicine functionally different?
114
   
  
 110 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 111 Id.  
 112 See JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE 49 (2007) (noting that Justice Blackmun 
had served as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic and retained a very high regard for 
medical doctors); see also THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 27 (11th ed. 2011) (“Blackmun said that if he had his life to live over 
again, he would like to be a medical doctor.”). 
 113 See supra Part I.A.1.a.    
 114 Several factors make medicine historically different, in particular its rela-
tively early reliance on modern physical science.  See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 189 
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It is the importance of care; care lies at the foundation of Justice 
Blackmun’s “unique relationship of trust.”115  Three critically related 
elements require this kind of caring relationship: (1) the significance 
of the values served, (2) the circumstances under which that service is 
rendered, and (3) the inadequacy of remedies for mistakes in that ser-
vice.  First, the values medicine serves, health and life itself, are pro-
foundly important to us, both as individuals and as a society.
116
  Se-
cond, medicine typically serves those values when we as recipients 
are extremely sensitive to their importance, our need, and our vulner-
ability.  In the paradigmatic situation of medical care even today, doc-
tors address our health when we are sick or injured and thus both 
helpless and vulnerable and, as a result, often acutely aware of our 
neediness.  And the third factor compounds these first two.  The cost 
of our doctor getting it wrong is, from our individual perspective, vir-
tually infinite and absolutely irreversible: one mistake can kill us, and 
nothing can bring us back.  It is, accordingly, extremely important to 
us as patients that doctors deliver their service right “the first time 
‘round.”  Initial mistakes would inflict a huge loss on the individual 
patient, loss of life itself, and this loss cannot adequately be restored 
post hoc.   
The practice of medicine, then, puts at risk a value of the highest 
order, life itself, under circumstances when those in need of proper 
performance feel most vulnerable to an infinite and irremediable loss.  
Not surprisingly, we urgently want our doctors to be supremely care-
ful under these circumstances.  More specifically, we need doctors to 
be more careful than either the gain-loss calculus of the market or the 
reward/penalty structure of the law can induce them to be.  We need 
people dedicated to, and adequately prepared for, giving the kind of 
care that our health and life depend upon; we want them to treat us as 
they would want themselves to be treated, as if they loved us as much 
as they love themselves and those to whom they are closest.  When 
  
(“The most familiar example of the shift to scientific legitimacy claims is that of 
nineteenth-century medicine.”).  LARSON, supra note 4, at 37. 
 115 The appropriate level of interpersonal care is not only a matter of funda-
mental concern to the law and other normative disciplines; a proper understanding of 
care may also have the most profound implications for ontology well.  See MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 225–69 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 
Harper Row, 1962), especially Part VI, Care as the Being of Da-Sein (grounding a 
phenomenology of being on a careful analysis of care, or sorge in the original Ger-
man). 
 116 FREIDSON, THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 161 (“There are a few disciplines 
whose tasks bear on issues of widespread interest and deep concern on the part of the 
general population.  These might be called core disciplines, bodies of knowledge and 
skill which address perennial problems that are of great importance to most of human-
ity.”). 
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what you feel you need is love, or something very like it, you’re not 
likely to be satisfied with either the letter of the law or the standards 
of the market.  In the justly famous words of Dr. Francis Weld Pea-
body of the Harvard Medical School, “The secret of the care of the 
patient is in caring for the patient.”117  This is also what makes medi-
cine the paradigm of the caring professions.   
 
3. Summary 
 
The traditional theory of the professions led us, in Part I, to focus 
on a salient difference between medicine and law:  the practice of law 
requires a knowledge of the public good that the practice of medicine 
does not.  In this Part, we have seen why it would be wrong to con-
clude that, for want of that kind of knowledge, medicine is not a prop-
er profession.   Looking beneath that difference, we found a more 
basic similarity:  proper delivery of the specialized knowledge peculi-
ar to medicine, every bit as much as the hybrid of special and general 
knowledge necessary for law, cannot be ensured to our satisfaction by 
the market or the state.  To operate optimally, both occupations re-
quire, beyond those mechanisms, a distinctive professional virtue.   
In the case of law, that virtue is commitment to the public good, 
sometimes against the interest of private clients; in the case of medi-
cine, that virtue is single-minded devotion to the physical well-being 
of individual patients, to the exclusion of all other otherwise relevant 
considerations.   The virtues of the two professions differ, even as 
their distinctive occupational knowledge differs.  What the two occu-
pations have in common—and what makes them both professions—is 
the need for a distinctive professional virtue, a disposition in the de-
livery of knowledge-based services that neither the market nor the 
state can adequately ensure.   
Fully to appreciate the importance of this common ground, we 
need to turn to the third element of the standard definition of the pro-
fessions.  That element is the claim that, in the face of certain kinds of 
market and government failures, the institutions of professionalism 
offer a superior guarantor of the proper application of specialized 
knowledge; that guarantor is, in a word, virtue.  As we shall see, this 
may indeed be true, but not in the way that traditional theory has 
maintained.   
 
  
 117 GROOPMAN, supra note 2 (quoting textual language as “one of the most 
celebrated statements in clinical medicine”). 
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B. Professional Virtues and Professional Institutions:  
Re-Mapping the Boundaries Between the       
Professions, the Market, and the State   
 
In the face of market and regulatory failure, the institutions of 
professionalism are supposed to offer a solution.  That solution, in a 
word (an admittedly old-fashioned word), is virtue.   Recall the words 
of Justice O’Connor, “One distinguishing feature of any profession . . 
. is that membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s self-
ish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct 
that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline 
of the market.”118  In the face of the two distinct vices we have identi-
fied—taking advantage of the clients’ relative ignorance and  exter-
nalizing costs upon third parties and the public, and the failure of both 
the market and the state adequately to police these vices—the profes-
sions plausibly claim to provide two distinct virtues.  The first is the 
virtue of professions like medicine; it places the client’s interests 
above the professional’s own.  The second virtue is that of professions 
like law; it places the public interest above the interests of both the 
client and the professional.
119
  The common aim of these virtues is to 
ensure proper application of each profession’s distinctive knowledge.   
The need for professional virtue brings us back to the basic af-
firmative proposition of the functionalist theory of the professions: 
autonomous professional institutions correct both market and gov-
ernment failure in the delivery of specialized professional knowledge.  
As we have seen, the professions claim to inculcate these virtues in 
the course of professional education, screen for them at the point of 
admission to practice, and ensure their application in the course of 
professional practice.  The bottom line is this: if an aspiring member 
of the profession does not manifest the relevant virtue, the profession 
will deny admission into its ranks; if members of the profession do 
not manifest the relevant virtue in practice, the profession will expel 
them. 
I have argued elsewhere that, with respect to the practice of law, 
the claimed superiority of professional institutions poses an inescapa-
ble double paradox: autonomous professional institutions with legal 
  
 118 Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 119 See Edwards, supra note 45, at 66 (“Good lawyers . . . must sometimes 
ignore their own self-interest, or the self-interest of their clients.”).  SIMON, supra note 
19, at 125 (noting that the self-regulatory regime of the “Progressive-Functionalist 
project” enforced two basic norms, which “are primarily concerned with the adequacy 
of service to clients, and secondarily concerned with fairness to third parties”). 
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control of educating and regulating their members are neither neces-
sary to guarantee distinctly professional knowledge nor sufficient to 
guarantee distinctly professional virtue.
120
  On the contrary, on both 
counts: the state can quite adequately guarantee the required 
knowledge, and professional institutions cannot apply legal coercion 
to ensure the necessary professional virtues. 
We cannot fully rehearse the arguments for those two conclusions 
here, but we do need to recapitulate them in enough detail to clarify 
critical parallels with the practice of medicine.  Let’s begin with the 
most basic, the argument that instrumentalities of the state can ade-
quately guarantee that members of the profession acquire the requisite 
university-level knowledge.  Appreciation of this knowledge may, ex 
hypothesi, require someone who has had that kind of training.  But it 
does not follow that this expert need act on behalf of an autonomous 
professional body.  He or she could just as well be an agent of the 
state.   
The current licensing regime for both law and medicine lends 
considerable support to this argument.  In order to practice either, an 
applicant must first pass an examination promulgated by an instru-
mentality of the state, medical boards in the case of medicine, the state 
supreme court in the case of law.  The refutation of the claim that 
screening for the requisite knowledge must be in the hands of an au-
tonomous professional body is simple: It is not in the hands of any 
such body now, in the case of either law or medicine.
121
    
What, then, of the other claim, that professional institutions are 
not sufficient to maintain the necessary professional virtues?  This 
second claim is both more important and more complex than the first.  
It rests on a proper understanding of the relationship between profes-
sional institutions and the state, which in turn requires a significant 
redefinition of professional institutions themselves.  In the traditional 
understanding, the decisions of professional bodies to admit or expel 
members must have the force of law; that is, in effect, what it means 
for the profession to have a monopoly on the provision of a particular 
service.  But the legal sword that guards the gate to professional prac-
tice is necessarily double-edged.  This is what the traditional treat-
ments of the professions, both favorable and critical, overlook.   
The basic problem is this: A professional body, acting with the 
force of law in its efforts to guarantee professional virtue, encounters 
precisely the same problems as the state, subject to the same limita-
  
 120 Atkinson, supra note 6.  
 121 FREIDSON, THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 3 (“[M]onopoly is essential to 
professionalism. . . .”).  Id. at 122 (“Ideal-typical professionalism is always dependent 
on the direct support of the state. . . .”). 
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tions.  The regulatory challenge to both the state and the profession is 
the same: the dilemma of imposing bright-line rules on conduct ideal-
ly left to the conscientious exercise of individual practitioners’ expert 
discretion.  As we have seen, drawn too tightly, the regulations unduly 
restrict the conscientious; left too loose, the regulations do not suffi-
ciently restrain the unscrupulous.
122
   
The professional body not only encounters the same problems as 
the state in regulating professional conduct, it also faces the same lim-
itations.  Once a professional body’s decisions have the force of law, 
that body itself is, as a matter of law, an instrumentality of the state.  
Accordingly, the grounds upon which professional bodies admit, dis-
cipline, and expel members must be legitimate legal grounds.  They 
must, in other words, pass muster before all the basic requirements 
and limits of liberal law.  In particular, the federal constitution pro-
tects professional licenses as liberty or property; the state and its in-
strumentalities can deny or revoke these licenses only with due pro-
cess of law, both procedural and substantive, and without imposing 
unconstitutional conditions.
123
  Professional bodies, every bit as much 
as routine state regulators, are forbidden to deprive people of their 
livelihood for violating “know it when I see it” standards.  The “void 
for vagueness” principle applies to professional bodies as well as state 
agencies, for the same reason: Professional bodies whose decisions 
carry the force of law are, for precisely that reason, agencies of the 
state.  
But the ideal standard of performance, in law and medicine, re-
spectively, cannot be stated with much more clarity than this: balance 
the interests of private clients with a proper concern for the public 
interest; be as attentive to individual patients as you possibly can.  
Holmes’s famous dictum that the law is for the bad man implies, for 
present purposes, its limitation: The law can punish people who fall 
below certain minimally acceptable standards, but the law cannot 
force people to be ideally good.
124
  In the practice of law, the state can 
punish those who violate the letter of the law, but it cannot punish 
those who refuse to commit themselves to its spirit.  To try to do that 
would produce this infinite regress: a literal law that commanded obe-
  
 122 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 123 See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 
(1972); see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 544 (1968); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Ex-
am’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957). 
 124 See Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457 (1897). 
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dience to the law’s spirit, and another law that commanded obedience 
to that law’s spirit, ad infinitum.125   
In the practice of medicine, similarly, the state can punish those 
who fall below minimum standards of care, but it cannot punish those 
who fail to treat their patients as they themselves would want to be 
treated.  The Golden Rule, for all its vaunted universality, is too vague 
to be made legally binding in any liberal state; it may well be the spirit 
of all secular law, but it can never be adequately incorporated into any 
legally binding obligation.  That is at least part of the Gospel’s mes-
sage: “[T]he letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”126  For all the 
reasons Lon Fuller identified nearly five decades ago, the law in its 
punitive capacity can set its standards for individual conduct only so 
high; if we aspire to more than the law can mandate, we must look to 
other institutions.
127
 
This means two fundamental things for professional institutions, 
one negative, the other positive.  First, the bad news—professional 
bodies cannot, by exercising the state’s coercive powers, guarantee 
the professional virtues that we have seen to be necessary for the op-
timal delivery of professional services.  They cannot make doctors 
adequately attentive to their individual patients’ health nor lawyers 
sufficiently mindful of the public interest. 
Now, the good news—professional bodies can, by a multitude of 
noncoercive means, cultivate those professional virtues that neither 
the market nor the state can guarantee.  Professional bodies cannot 
deny their members basic property or liberty interests under vague, 
“know it when I see it,” standards, but that does not mean that these 
standards are neither meaningful nor useful.  Quite the contrary, 
sometimes experts really do recognize subtle but significant depar-
tures from occupational ideals too lofty for the law to incorporate.  
What’s more, nothing in the law forbids professional bodies to make 
these ideals the basis for a system of relatively effective sanctions, 
both positive and negative.  On the negative side, it can reprimand or 
admonish, publicly or privately, members who lapse from the profes-
sional ideal; on the positive side, it can reward self-abnegating, other-
regarding conduct with comradely commendations and mutual re-
  
 125 See Atkinson, supra note 20, at 283–84, 287–94; John F. Sutton, Jr., Out-
lawing Unjust Rules of Law: A Response to Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1517 
(1989).  The author parodies as a solution to legal but unjust results obtained by litiga-
tion a proposal to “[e]nact yet another law – but this time, an awesomely overriding 
law that outlaws lawyers’ ‘quibbling’[.]” Id.  
 126 2 Corinthians 3:6. 
 127 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30–32 (1964). 
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spect.
128
  Armed with this more extensive arsenal and able to take 
more precise aim at the problems of professional misconduct, profes-
sional bodies may indeed be able both to set their standards higher
129
 
and to apply them with greater precision than either the law or the 
market.
130
   
These, then, are the two absolutely fundamental points about pro-
fessional institutions and professional virtues, each precisely comple-
mentary to the other: On the one hand, professional institutions can no 
more guarantee essential professional virtues through legal coercion 
than can the regulatory state; on the other hand, professional institu-
tions may, by noncoercive means, be able to provide levels of profes-
sional virtue beyond what the market and state can provide.  To 
properly appreciate the role of professional institutions, we must nei-
ther overestimate nor underestimate their power.  The standard theory 
of the professions pays too little attention to the limits of professional 
institutions.  Revisionist theorists pay too little attention to profes-
sional institutions’ potential to promote the necessary professional 
virtues, insisting that all talk of professional virtue is cant and that 
professional bodies exist only to advance the interest of their members 
against the laity.   
Just because the law, acting through either state or professional 
institutions, cannot guarantee professional virtues does not mean that 
we do not need those virtues.   Even though there is no way through 
legally coercive means to ensure that doctors are especially careful or 
that lawyers are attentive to the public interest, our society is still bet-
ter off if they are.  And, just because there are no legal means to en-
sure these virtues, it does not follow either that the law has no role in 
their encouragement or that other institutions cannot promote them by 
  
 128 Parsons, supra note 13, at 43–46; FREIDSON, supra note 4, at 108; see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 7 (2010) (In addition to the rules of 
professional conduct, “a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the appro-
bation of professional peers.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble 
(1980) (Although the lawyer is to be guided by both the Code and personal con-
science, “in the final analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of mem-
bers of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a 
lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct” and “the pos-
sible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”). 
 129 See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 21 (1986) (not-
ing that lawyers may be subject to civil remedies, criminal sanctions, and other formal 
regulation in addition to professional discipline); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 (2000). 
 130 See SIMON, supra note 19, at 123 (“The system can function in the absence 
of the material incentives of the market and the bureaucracy because professional 
work organized in this manner provides its practitioners with satisfactions that moti-
vate responsibility.”). 
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other means.  The converse is, in fact, true on both counts: profession-
al organizations without the coercive power of the state can insist that 
their members embrace and embody the necessary virtues, even as the 
state, by non-coercive means, can encourage all practitioners to do the 
same.  The latter is an entirely appropriate, if peripheral, function of 
the law;
131
 the former is the core function of professional institutions, 
properly understood.  The state can urge its professionals to be virtu-
ous, even as it can urge its soldiers to be brave and its citizens to be 
patriotic.  Professional bodies, by contrast, promote virtue by persua-
sive means as their core mission.   
 
C. Re-Integrating Professional Knowledge, Virtues, 
and Institutions: Refining the Ideal-Type       
Profession 
 
Maintaining the necessary balance between the limits and capaci-
ties of professional institutions, both in theory and in practice, requires 
a major refinement in our understanding of the role of those institu-
tions, particularly their relationship with the state and the market.  
This section first sets out that refinement, then compares it with the 
prior understanding of both functionalists and revisionists. 
 
1. A New Taxonomy of Professional Virtue: One 
Genus, Two Species   
 
We have seen that the definition of a profession common to both 
its defenders and its critics does not fit what both take to be the para-
digmatic profession, the modern practice of medicine, with respect to 
either of its essential parts, its substantive claim about professional 
knowledge and its formal claim about professional organization.    
With respect to the knowledge claim, we saw in Part I that the practice 
of medicine does not require the “wedding of special and general 
knowledge” that is supposed to distinguish the professions from other 
occupations that involve advanced technical knowledge.  By contrast, 
we saw that law does in fact require just such a “wedding.”   
But we also saw that it is not that particular kind of “hybrid” 
knowledge alone that distinguishes law from other occupations that 
entail the application of formal knowledge.  The practice of law re-
quires that wedding of general and special knowledge for the benefit 
of both private clients and the public good; only in the latter case, 
however, are both the market and the state predictably unable to guar-
  
 131 Atkinson, supra note 20, at 274. 
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antee the proper application of that knowledge.  What makes the prac-
tice of law distinct, therefore, seems to be, not a particular kind of 
formal knowledge, but rather a constellation of factors that makes the 
optimal delivery of that kind of knowledge impossible for the market 
and the state to ensure. 
With that insight, in this Part we looked back at the practice of 
medicine and found a similar constellation of factors: for a variety of 
related reasons, the level of care our society insists on from its practic-
ing physicians, like the commitment to the public good that our repub-
lic requires of its lawyers, cannot be guaranteed by either the market 
or the state.  On the other hand, that level of care, like lawyers’ com-
mitment to the public good, may well be enhanced by special institu-
tions of the occupation itself. 
We can now draw these points together into a significant refine-
ment of the functionalist definition of a profession: 
A profession is an occupation that delivers a socially significant 
service entailing university-based knowledge under conditions in 
which optimal performance requires of practitioners an occupation-
related virtue—principal-protective in the caring professions, public-
protective in the public professions—which neither private contracts 
nor state regulation can adequately guarantee, but which special occu-
pational institutions can significantly enhance. 
This is, obviously, a definition that only a sociologist or a lawyer 
could love; even for us, it admittedly needs a good bit of unpacking if 
its full implications are to be clear. 
The first step in unpacking this definition is to notice that the ge-
nus of neo-classical professional virtue—the personal commitment 
essential to the optimal deployment of professional knowledge—has 
two distinct species, of which medicine and law provide the respective 
paradigms:  principal-protecting virtue and public-protecting virtue.  
The next step is to trace that division back to the dual government and 
market failure that professions typically address.  And then we can 
better see how addressing these failures produces two distinctive 
kinds of professions, parallel to, but not quite congruent with, the tra-
ditional distinction between “learned” and “caring” professions.     
Recall that professions address two basic forms of market failure: 
information asymmetries and externalities.
132
  Information asymme-
  
 132 See POSNER, supra note 23, at 112–13; see also SEIDENFELD, supra note 
24, at 63–67; see FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 79 
(“The requirement of discretionary specializations . . . and most particularly those 
based on esoteric, abstract theory, poses a serious problem to prospective labor con-
sumers.  How are they to judge whether a particular worker is able to perform tasks 
adequately?”).  
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tries typically pose the risk that the service provider will exploit the 
consumer; externalities typically threaten third parties or the public.
133
  
The distinctive problem with the practice of medicine is insufficient 
attention to patients, the recipients of the services in question—
failure, in other words, properly to apply specialized knowledge for 
the patient’s benefit.  The distinctive problem with the practice of law, 
by contrast, is insufficient attention to the public interest, failure 
properly to apply knowledge of the public good in the course of repre-
senting private clients.  The besetting “vices” of  doctors and lawyers 
are thus distinct, each involving exploitation of a different but funda-
mental form of market failure. 
It is important to notice, however, that this “mapping” of profes-
sional virtues and vices onto market failures is not perfect.  Not all 
information asymmetries and externalities require professions.  Some 
market failures can be adequately addressed by other means, typically 
routine government regulation.  Only when those means are inade-
quate is it necessary to rely on professional virtue and the professional 
institutions that sustain it as guarantees of professional performance. 
 
Even as the two distinctive professional virtues we have identified 
do not map perfectly onto the general forms of market failure that 
underlie them, so the two kinds of professions that embody those vir-
tues do not quite perfectly map onto the existing subcategories of pro-
fessions.  Public-protective professions like law and principal-
protecting professions like medicine cannot quite accurately be de-
scribed as “learned” and “caring” professions, respectively.  Our re-
finement of the general definition of profession implies its own sub-
sets, with clearer bounds and foundations than the subcategories pre-
viously offered. 
There is, to be sure, obvious overlap.  Public-protecting profes-
sions must be versed not only in university-based formal knowledge, 
but also in the general cultural knowledge of a liberal education.  Pub-
lic-protecting professionals, then, are more learned than principal-
protecting professions in the sense that practitioners of public-
protective professions must master two forms of learning, not just one.  
And principal-protecting professions must be especially careful in the 
application of their occupational knowledge to the particular individu-
als whom they serve.  They must be, in that sense, more caring than 
public-protective professions.  Thus it would make sense to see the 
  
 133 See Morgan, supra note 30, at 705, 710–11 (“[T]he costs of dispute resolu-
tion and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties–the social costs 
involved are borne by society as a whole.”). 
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public-protective professions as distinctly “learned” and the client-
protective professions as distinctly “caring.” 
But these associations between the two professional virtues we 
have just identified and the two terms in common use for subcatego-
ries of professions are also misleading.  For one thing, it is the public-
protecting professions’ commitment to the public good, every bit as 
much as their knowledge of the public good, that sets them apart; in 
that critical respect, they are as much “caring” as “learned.”  What 
distinguishes them from principal-protecting professions is not that 
they are less caring, but rather that their care has a different focus.    
Even as the public-protective professions are not less caring in 
this respect, so, too, the principal-protective professions are not less 
learned in another.  Their knowledge, like the public-protective pro-
fessional’s care, simply has a different focus.  What’s more, the tradi-
tional terms are unfortunately asymmetrical: “learned” refers to the 
professional knowledge base, not the professional virtue; “caring” 
refers to the professional virtue, not the professional knowledge base. 
For all these reasons, then, the traditional terms “learned” and 
“caring” are not entirely adequate synonyms for “public-protecting” 
and “principal-protecting.”  On the other hand, the latter, more precise 
terms suffer disadvantages of their own.  For one thing, they are neol-
ogisms; for another, their hyphenated form probably costs as much in 
unwieldiness as it adds in symmetry and accuracy.  The discussion 
that follows, then, sometimes uses the terms “public” and “caring” as 
convenient short-hands, bearing in mind the qualifications noted here.  
As we shall see, these qualifications are quite important, because they 
involve the deepest difference between our refined understanding of 
the professions and its predecessors.      
 
2. Comparison with the Prior Definition 
 
At this point it will be helpful to compare the refined definition of 
profession with the more traditional definition.  We begin with the 
basic point of agreement, the common focus on professional function, 
and then examine the most significant difference, the new definition’s 
focus on professional virtue. 
 
a. The Basic Agreement: A Common 
Focus on Professional Function 
 
The most significant thing about the refined definition is this: it is 
a refinement, not a rejection, of the standard definition.  It keeps in 
place all three defining features of the classic professions: (1) formal 
learning in service of an essential social function, (2) the performance 
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of which service cannot be guaranteed by the “normal” means of gov-
ernment-regulated private contracts between providers and consum-
ers, (3) thus requiring special professional institutions.   
The practice of both law and medicine entails the application of 
university-based knowledge in the performance of two critical social 
functions, respectively, maintaining optimal order in a complex socie-
ty and promoting the physical health of individuals.  And the applica-
tion of both kinds of specialized knowledge presents problems for the 
presumptive mode of production in a capitalist market economy (con-
tracts between providers and consumers, subject to regulation by the 
state to protect both consumers and the public).  The institutions of 
professionalism offer better ways to guarantee proper deployment of 
professional knowledge than the institutions of market regulation 
alone.  All this is entirely consistent with prevailing theory.   
 
b. The Critical Distinction:  A New 
Focus on Professional Virtue  
 
That said, it is important to underscore the one salient way in 
which the revised ideal type differs from prior versions: its focus on 
professional virtue.  This new focus improves the older definition in 
two related ways.  It shows both why specialized knowledge is not 
sufficient to account for professional status and why market closure is 
not necessary. 
 
(1) Specialized Knowledge as 
an Insufficient Condition 
 
The standard ideal-type profession tends to be either over- or un-
der-inclusive.  On the one hand, if we treat as professions all occupa-
tions that involve the discretionary application of university-based 
formal knowledge, we sweep in occupations like actuaries that seem 
to perform adequately under routine conditions of regulated markets.  
On the other hand, if we narrow the definition by insisting that univer-
sity-based formal knowledge be somehow “wedded” to a university-
level liberal education, we find that medicine, along with actuarial 
science, falls on the non-professional side of the line.  Once we focus 
on professional virtue as an element that is both essential to the ade-
quate delivery of certain kinds of specialized knowledge and yet im-
possible to secure with either private contracts or state regulations, 
then the problems of both under- and over-inclusiveness disappear. 
Not all occupations that require the application of university-
based knowledge, even in the performance of the most socially signif-
icant of purposes, would qualify as professions under the revised defi-
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nition of professional, but only those occupations that, in addition, 
pose problems of both market- and government-failure like those that 
beset the practice of law and medicine.  Proper application of some 
kinds of university-based knowledge to vital social functions may 
well be sufficiently handled by the usual regulatory methods (e.g., 
government licensing of suppliers and monitoring of contracts be-
tween suppliers and consumers). 
Professional virtue, on this analysis, is what unites the functions 
of professions, the delivery of socially significant special knowledge, 
with their form, the institutions necessary to ensure that delivery.  
Professional virtue is what guarantees the proper application of pro-
fessional knowledge; professional virtue is something only profes-
sional institutions can provide.
134
  If the state regulation of ordinary 
for-profit suppliers is adequate to ensure proper delivery of an occupa-
tion’s particular kind of formal knowledge, then that occupation need 
not be organized as a profession.  Thus, medicine and law can be seen 
as proper professions; actuarial science cannot. 
 
(2) Market Control as an    
Unnecessary Condition 
 
In addition to adding an element, professional virtue, omitted by 
the standard model, the revised ideal type drops an element that the 
standard model includes—market closure.  Both functionalists and 
revisionists tend to assume that, in order for an occupation that applies 
formal knowledge to be a profession, it must have state-delegated 
power to control delivery of its service.  To be a profession, in other 
words, a knowledge-based occupation must also exercise a state-
authorized monopoly.  And, conversely, both functionalists and revi-
sionists tend to assume that if an occupation that delivers the requisite 
kind of knowledge achieves market control it has also achieved pro-
fessional status. 
Our focus on professional virtue suggests that, here again, the tra-
ditional version of the ideal type is both over- and under-inclusive.  It 
is over-inclusive because it recognizes as professions knowledge-
based occupational monopolies that do not require professional virtue 
  
 134 Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (“One distinguishing feature of any profession . . . is that membership entails an 
ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to 
standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the 
discipline of the market.”). 
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to perform adequately (e.g., certified public accountants).
135
  On the 
other hand, the focus on market closure may be under-inclusive be-
cause it fails to recognize as professions occupations that require both 
professional knowledge and professional virtue for their proper per-
formance, even though they do not need a state-sponsored monopoly 
to ensure professional knowledge.
136
  As I have argued elsewhere, this 
seems to be the case with elite business management.
137
  The problem 
here is not information asymmetry, but externalities.  The corpora-
tions that hire managers may well be able to determine whether they 
possess and competently deploy the necessary knowledge base.
138
  If 
so, the employers of corporate management have no need for either 
occupational licensing or professional virtue.  But the public needs 
business executives to be attentive to the public good, not just their 
client’s interest.  And this public-protective virtue is precisely what 
legal controls cannot guarantee.       
 
3. Summary   
 
This section’s revision of the ideal-type profession leaves the core 
of the traditional ideal type intact: A profession is an occupation that 
applies university-based education in the service of socially important 
services, under conditions where neither private contracts nor state 
regulation can ensure proper performance of that service.  This revi-
sion is nonetheless significant.  It has added one element, professional 
virtue, even as it has subtracted another, market control.  The result is 
an ideal-type profession that is neither over-inclusive nor under-
inclusive, because it recognizes as proper professions only those oc-
cupations in which the professional mode of organization actually 
enhances the occupation’s function, delivering university-based in-
formation in the provision of a significant social service. 
 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEO-CLASSICAL 
PROFESSIONALISM    
 
Building on Part II’s refined definition of professionalism, this 
Part spells out the fuller implications of those refinements, particularly 
the emphasis on professional virtue.   Part III.A continues to test those 
  
 135 See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 215, 226–39 (identifying “quantitative in-
formation professionals,” including engineers, accountants, and statisticians). 
 136 See id. at 9 (“Any occupation can obtain licensure (e.g., beauticians) . . . 
.”). 
 137 Atkinson, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
 138 See supra Part II.B. 
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refinements against the practices of medicine and law, and, vice versa, 
to test medicine and law against that refined definition.  Focusing on 
the defining virtues of the two paradigmatic professions clarifies how 
those two professions should be structured to foster their distinctive 
virtues, even as it shows how a proper understanding of the role of 
those virtues gives us a more precise understanding of the proper pa-
rameters of medicine and law and, more generally, of the caring and 
public professions as a whole.  Part III.B extends the refined defini-
tion of professionalism to other occupations, the better to mark the 
line between the professional and the non-professional.  And that, in 
turn, gives us a better sense of the distinction between professional 
virtues and other occupational virtues.  Finally, Part III.C shows how 
law and medicine as the paradigmatic principal-protecting and public-
protecting professions not only serve our society, but reciprocally 
depend upon and define that society itself.  Ours is a society that cre-
ates professionals, even as professionals sustain our society’s core 
values.     
 
A. Revisiting Medicine and Law: Refining the Basic 
Concepts, Reforming the Paradigmatic        
Professions 
 
Part I contrasted the practices of medicine and law to show that 
medicine lacks what traditional theory has made a hallmark of ideal-
type professions: a wedding of university-based technical knowledge 
with a classical liberal education.  Physicians can perform their core 
function, providing individual health care, without a grounding in 
historical debates about the public good; lawyers necessary participate 
in that very debate in performing their core function, providing justice 
under law.  Part II showed how a closer look at medicine and law 
suggests a significant modification of traditional theory.  We traced 
the foundation of medicine’s professional standing to a different 
source, the distinctive professional virtue of care.    
On that analysis, what links medicine and law as professions is 
the necessity for professional virtue, a kind of commitment to occupa-
tional performance on the part of doctors and lawyers, which cannot 
be optimally guaranteed by either the market or the state, but which 
can be significantly enhanced by professional bodies acting without 
the force of law.  On the other hand, what distinguishes medicine from 
law, at the highest level of generality, is precisely this distinctly pro-
fessional virtue.  In medicine, that virtue is client-protective; in law, it 
is public-protective; medicine, then, is the paradigm of the caring pro-
fessions, even as law is the paradigm of the public professions.  We 
were thus able to see law and medicine as paradigms of two basic 
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professional categories, the principal-protecting or caring professions 
and the public-protective or public professions.  Here we take up that 
line of analysis again, the better to understand both the professions of 
law and medicine and the caring and public professions more general-
ly.  
Our revised understanding of the ideal-type profession, drawn 
largely from our examination of the distinctive functions of law and 
medicine, has implications for those occupations as they are now con-
stituted, even as those arrangements point to further refinements in the 
theory itself.  This analysis begins with the respective cores of medi-
cine and law, then looks at areas of overlap, and concludes with areas 
of practice at the peripheries of both professions.  
 
1. At the Core of the Legal and Medical      
Professions: Preserving the Critical Virtues    
 
Both functionalists and revisionists agree that professional form 
should follow professional function; professional institutions should 
be organized to ensure professional performance.  Functionalists and 
revisionists differ, of course, on how closely occupational reality 
matches the theoretical ideal.  Our revised ideal type of professional-
ism, with its focus on professional virtue, sharpens that debate.  Given 
that professional virtue is a necessary precondition of the proper de-
ployment of professional knowledge, the professions should be struc-
tured so as to enable and encourage individual practitioners to exer-
cise their professional virtue.  If the primary need for professional 
institutions is to ensure professional virtue, then the primary goal of 
professional institutions should be to enhance, or at least not under-
mine, that virtue.  To paraphrase the Hippocratic Oath: Every profes-
sional institution should improve professional performance; none 
should make it worse. 
This basic principle has obvious and important implications for 
our two paradigmatic professions, law and medicine.  In the case of 
medicine, anything that systematically undermines the physician’s 
ability to give the appropriately high level of care to an individual 
patient is presumptively dysfunctional.  And a precisely parallel anal-
ysis applies to law.  Anything that systematically undermines the law-
yer’s ability properly to weigh a private client’s interest against the 
public interest is, again, presumptively suspect.     
When we apply that principle to doctors and lawyers, we note a 
paradox that underscores the importance of distinguishing between the 
caring and the learned professions:  What is good for promoting pro-
fessional virtue of one kind may well be bad for the other.  Institution-
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al arrangements that encourage proper performance in one kind of 
profession may be truly devastating if imported into the other kind.     
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of professional compensa-
tion.  The necessary structure of payments in the private practice of 
law might well undermine client-protective virtue in medicine.  In a 
basically capitalist economy, those who consume goods and services 
typically pay for them; all things being equal, that ensures that re-
sources are efficiently allocated or, more colloquially, that consumers 
get what they pay for.  But, of course, things are not always equal; 
two basic forms of market failure, information asymmetries and ex-
ternalities, sometimes upset the market’s normal equilibrium.  As we 
have seen, professional virtue, enhanced by professional institutions, 
is the optimal solution to these two problems in certain situations.   
We now need to notice how market factors not only produce the 
need for professional virtue, but also influence the likelihood of its 
effectiveness.  The basic point is this: if the source of payment for 
professional services is different from the beneficiary of professional 
virtue, professional virtue will predictably suffer.  This asymmetry of 
incentives is at the very root of the defining problem of the legal pro-
fession.  Private clients typically pay for their own lawyers; converse-
ly, those lawyers’ attention to the public good redounds primarily to 
the benefit of third parties or the public, not to private clients.  Ac-
cordingly, private clients have every reason to pay top dollar for law-
yers who advance private client interests the most and attend to the 
public good the least.  For reasons nicely isolated in the literature on 
legal insurance and civil legal assistance, it would be very difficult to 
structure third-party payment for legal services.
139
  We seem to be 
stuck, then, with a system of compensating lawyers that entails direct 
disincentives against the legal profession’s defining virtue. 
In traditional medical care, by contrast, the relationship between 
the beneficiary of the professional virtue and the payment for the pro-
fessional service is quite different.  When patients pay their own doc-
tors, patients themselves benefit from the doctor’s distinctive profes-
sional virtue, a level of care beyond what the market or the state could 
guarantee.  As our society moves, for various reasons, away from pa-
tient payment to third party payment, we move from that traditional 
identity of payer and beneficiary toward a situation more like that of 
law, where payer and beneficiary are typically different.   
Precisely here, however, we need to notice a significant distinc-
tion between the two situations: in law, those who pay for the service 
  
 139 See Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment: Beyond the 
Insurance Defense Paradigm, 16 REV. LITIG. 585, 607–10 (1997). 
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and those who receive the principal benefit of professional virtue are 
not only different, but also almost inevitably antagonistic.  Private 
client’s pay for legal services; the distinctive virtue of lawyers pro-
tects the public interest against what lawyers might do for those very 
clients.  Third party payments for doctors’ services would inevitably 
separate the payer from the beneficiary, but that need not make their 
interests antagonistic.  In restructuring payments for medical services, 
we may be able to select for arrangements that are more protective of 
the basic virtue of doctors—single-minded attention to care for their 
patients.   
In seeking these arrangements, interestingly, the factor most rele-
vant to preserving professional virtue on the part of doctors may be 
preserving choice on the part of patients.  And patient choice would 
be important whether the third-party payment system were public or 
private.  Without the chastening effect of patient choice in a private 
system, for-profit payers might tend to profit by favoring doctors who 
skimp on patient care.  And without the chastening effect of patient 
choice in a public system, doctors would certainly have an incentive 
to slack off on patient care.  In any case, a system of third-party pay-
ments for medical care should focus on structures that enhance or 
preserve the basic professional virtue of doctors—higher levels of 
care than either the market or the state can ensure.
140
 
  
 140 There is, of course, another side to this story.  Although, ex hypothesi, 
only members of caring professions can be expected to insist upon the appropriately 
high level of individual care that we have identified, this is not to say that individual 
physicians should have carte blanche in all questions of patient care.  By our standard, 
that, too, is automatically suspicious, for converse reasons.   The very exercise of their 
defining virtue, single-minded devotion to individual patients, means that, in the case 
of each particular patient, the physician is likely to focus on benefits to that patient 
and to ignore costs to other parties and the public.   
This dilemma, of course, is very near the central issue of all third-party health-care 
systems, and such systems, already widespread, show every indication of expanding.   
Identifying the role of the physician’s defining virtue in this dilemma obviously has 
important implications for its resolution.  On the one hand, cost-containment will 
surely have to entail the establishment of treatment protocols that incorporate some 
form of cost-benefit analysis, some weighing of benefits to individual patients against 
costs to third parties; as we have seen, the setting of these parameters is quite beyond 
the purview of doctors, acting as doctors; it entails questions of the public good out-
side the scope of their professional expertise as health-care providers.  On the other 
hand, the survival of the level of care that we depend upon doctors, as caring profes-
sionals, to ensure demands that control of individual patient care remain essentially in 
their hands.  Members of the caring professions, paradigmatically doctors, must pre-
side over the care of individual patients.   The lesson for present purposes is this:  Any 
systemic shifting of responsibility for individual patient care away from physicians 
and onto nonprofessionals is, by our standard, automatically suspicious. 
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That leads to a final, broader point, which is something of a para-
dox: law may be more essentially a profession than medicine, precise-
ly because law’s distinctive virtue is always more at risk.  Third party 
payments for medical services do not necessarily place patients at 
odds with their doctors, consequently, the professional virtue of pa-
tient care is not in grave danger.  On the other hand, that antagonism 
is virtually unavoidable in the case of the private practice of law, 
where lawyers’ public-protective virtue functions specifically to coun-
terbalance the interests of the private clients who pay them.  Here is 
the paradox: because the standard mode of lawyers’ compensation is 
inherently corrosive of their professional virtue, the practice of law is, 
for that very reason, all the more in need of strong professional insti-
tutions.   
2. In Between the Principal-Protecting and 
Public-Protecting Professions 
 
Law and medicine, we have seen, are paradigms, respectively, of 
the public and the caring professions.  The critical legal function of 
making appeals to the public good requires general cultural 
knowledge; the care of individual patients demands an extraordinary 
measure of devotion to each individual patient.  As soon as we apply 
these templates to the actual work of lawyers and doctors, however, 
we note several significant mismatches between the “ideal” and the 
“real.”  Sometimes a medical or legal specialty will need the defining 
virtue of the other profession, in addition to, or even instead of, its 
own.  More significantly, sometimes a medical or legal specialty will 
require neither virtue; conversely, sometimes an occupation allied to 
law or medicine but not recognized as a part of that profession will 
require its virtue, and thus warrant inclusion in its ranks.  All of these 
anomalies require appropriate adjustments in professional status, in 
both theory and practice. 
 
a. Hybrids: Double Doses of     
Professional Virtue 
 
Let’s consider first the easiest case, specialties in law and medi-
cine that seem to involve elements of the other profession’s defining 
virtue.  Some medical doctors may need a commitment to the public 
good, even as some lawyers may need especially great concern for an 
individual client’s welfare.  This seems to be true of doctors who deal 
with mental health and lawyers who deal with family crises.   
Psychotherapy nicely represents this kind of amphibious medical 
specialty; its practitioners need not only the extraordinary care that all 
doctors owe their patients, but also the appreciation of fundamental 
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social norms that makes law a public profession.  Mental health, far 
more than physical health, is a matter of enabling individual patients 
to integrate themselves successfully into contemporary society, that, 
in turn, entails a deep enough appreciation of society to call its norms 
and mores into question.  To take only the most salient example, ho-
mosexuality was all too recently listed as a disorder to be treated;
141
 
now we (generally) recognize gay and lesbian lifestyles as entirely 
legitimate and (generally) treat homophobia as aberrant and discrimi-
nation based on sexual preference as immoral, even illegal.   
In order to appreciate where the necessary adjustments need to be 
made, in the patient or in the patient’s social setting, the psychothera-
pist has to be able to assess both individual and society, in consulta-
tion with professional colleagues, by the most basic norms of our 
common culture.
142
  If they are truly to be healers of the soul, they 
must have the fullest possible understanding of what our culture un-
derstands to be the whole range of possibilities for not just “mental 
health,” but also human flourishing. 
The practice of family law involves a comparable duality of pro-
fessional virtues.  Perhaps in large part because of their close practical 
alliance with psychotherapists, lawyers who deal with families in cri-
sis must be deeply caring as well as a committed to the public good.  
On the one hand, clients in such cases are often extraordinarily dis-
traught, and the issues they present are among the most fundamental 
imaginable—the economic and social restructuring of relations among 
parents and children.  The resolution of these issues may well deter-
mine not only the quality, but even the duration, of life itself, and thus 
requires the utmost care on the part of lawyers.  On the other hand, the 
standard of determining custody issues nicely illustrates the need for 
family lawyers also to be well versed in both the humanities and the 
social sciences.  That standard, the best interest of the child, incorpo-
rates into law a balancing of the most profound values in our common 
culture, guided by the most subtle assessments of our social sci-
ence.
143
  Thus, even as “doctors of the soul” must be liberally learned 
as well as caring, so lawyers for families in crisis must be not only 
liberally learned, but also caring. 
  
 141 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, APA DOCUMENT REFERENCE NO. 730008, 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISTURBANCE: PROPOSED CHANGE IN 
DSM-II, 6TH PRINTING, PAGE 44 POSITION STATEMENT (RETIRED) (1973), available at 
http://www.torahdec.org/Downloads/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf. 
 142 See Judith H. Katz, The Sociopolitcal Nature of Counseling, 13 THE 
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 615, 615 (1985) (stating that the psychologist’s profes-
sion has “at its core a set of cultural values and norms by which clients are judged”). 
 143 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA 
FREUD, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, at xiii (1998). 
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b. Exceptions that Prove the Rules: 
Branches of One Profession with the 
Virtues of the Other   
 
In more peculiar cases, a specialty in one profession may need the 
virtue of the other, not in addition to its own, as we have just seen 
with psychotherapy and family law, but instead of its own.  In this 
latter situation, doctors would place the public interest above care for 
individual patients, even as lawyers would weigh the interests of indi-
vidual clients much more heavily against the public interest than 
would normally be appropriate.  This “virtue reversal” might be true, 
for example, of epidemiologists, who must look to the public health 
rather than to the health of particular individuals.  It might also be true 
of lawyers who represent defendants accused of serious crimes, espe-
cially those punishable by death.  The public health doctors must be 
committed to advancing the public good, even as typical lawyers are; 
criminal defense lawyers need to be especially careful of the cases of 
an individual client in a very vulnerable position even as typical doc-
tors are.   
In the special case of criminal defense lawyers, as in the case of 
the typical physician, the life of the layperson is in the hands of the 
professional.  Death-row inmates will quite literally die, not only if 
their lawyers make mistakes, but also if they fail to go to lengths hero-
ic by any ordinary measure of professional competence.  And criminal 
defense lawyers need be less concerned with any public interest run-
ning counter to their individual client’s interest, since in every crimi-
nal case the public interest is doubly protected, by the public prosecu-
tor advancing the case and by the judge hearing the case.  
On the other hand, epidemiologists hardly need exercise the kind 
of care required of doctors who treat individual patients, and may in-
deed be hampered by it—as, for example, when the need to identify 
sources of contagion conflicts with the privacy interests of the indi-
viduals infected.  With public health doctors and criminal defense 
lawyers, then, professional virtues are largely reversed.   
 
c. On the Frontiers of the Paradigmatic 
Professions 
 
We have seen that some recognized medical and legal specialties 
require the defining virtue of the other profession, either in addition to 
or instead of their own.  Now we need to consider two logically and 
practically related possibilities: in analyzing some practice areas to 
determine whether they need the relevant professional virtues, we may 
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discover both “false positives” and “false negatives.”  False positives 
will be those specialties recognized today as part of the legal or medi-
cal profession, even though they do not require the defining virtues of 
either profession, and thus may not properly be part of the profession 
at all.  False negatives will be those specialties allied to law or medi-
cine that are not considered within either profession, even though they  
do require their respective virtues, and thus should be recognized as 
part of the appropriate profession.  We will consider these opposing 
situations in turn: first, occupations that have slipped inside the pro-
fessional folds without demonstrating proper functions, second, those 
with properly professional functions that have been fenced out.  
 
(1) False Positives:             
Faux Professions  
 
To appreciate this situation, consider, first, the cases of pathology 
and radiology.  Why would a pathologist or radiologist need to exer-
cise any more care of the relevant kind than, say, a technician per-
forming similar analyses?  We need both of them to be extremely 
careful; neither will likely ever be in the physical presence of a pa-
tient, and both will almost certainly be reporting to a primary care 
physician.  In both cases, what we need is someone, perhaps the pri-
mary care physician, ensuring that proper care is being taken.   
So, too, with some specialties in the law.  Searching real estate ti-
tles, probating wills, and securing uncontested divorces are not likely 
to implicate basic questions about the public good, much less weigh-
ing the interests of private clients against the public good in applying 
the law.  The law has long recognized that relatively routinized areas 
of practice pose less risk of information asymmetries, and thus are 
subject to less intrusive state regulation.
144
   Under our analysis, this 
sword may have another edge, which cuts these areas of practice out 
of the profession altogether.    
 
(2) False Negatives:                                     
Unrecognized Professions   
 
As we have just seen, the neo-classical definition of the profes-
sions, with its focus on the need for very specific kinds of occupation-
ally-related virtue, would call for some practitioners in the legal and 
the medical fields to be considered outside the scope of both profes-
  
 144 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (finding that risks 
to clients associated with advertising of fees for routinized services do not warrant 
total prohibition of advertisements). 
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sions, properly defined.  The converse, however, is equally true, and 
almost certainly more significant: Sometimes a highly technical occu-
pation allied to law or medicine and requiring the relevant virtue for 
its proper practice has nonetheless not been recognized as a profession 
at all.   
On the medical side, psychotherapy nicely illustrates this situa-
tion.  All psychiatrists are medical doctors, but not all psychothera-
pists are psychiatrists.  Some psychotherapists, generally grouped 
together as clinical psychologists,
145
 are typically certified in universi-
ty-based scientific study and have to undergo supervised clinical train-
ing.  Their practice, though traditionally not classified as medicine, 
would seem to involve a need for the same high level of individual 
care as their counterparts in psychiatry.
146
 
On the legal side, the management of publicly-held corporations 
nicely illustrates the case of an occupation closely allied with law that 
would seem to require not only an equally high level of technical ex-
pertise, but also an equal measure of the profession’s defining virtue, 
commitment to the public good.  And so the calls, now nearly a centu-
ry old, for management to become a profession have referred not only 
to the level of technical training involved, but also the importance of 
concern for the public welfare.
147
      
 
B. The Professions and Other Occupations 
 
Having refined our neo-classical definition of professionalism in 
the paradigm cases of law and medicine, we can now extend it to oth-
er occupations, noting in the process some of its more general fea-
tures.   We saw, at the end of the last section, that neo-classical pro-
fessionalism gives us the criteria for redrawing the borders of the tra-
ditional principal-protecting and public-protecting professions, medi-
cine and law.  It gives us, in other words, a way to distinguish, within 
genuine professions, between those traditional elements that are 
properly professional and those that are not.   
It is but a small step to apply the same criteria to other occupa-
tions further afield.  Just as our virtue-based standard can distinguish 
between the truly and the spuriously professional elements within the 
traditional professions, so it can, by reasonable extrapolation, among 
occupations as a whole.  At the highest level of generality, this exten-
sion would logically entail three steps: (1) determining whether the 
occupation in question is a proper profession; (2) deciding whether its 
  
 145 ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 300–01. 
 146 See FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 54.  
 147 See BRANDEIS, supra note 16, at 1. 
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essential virtue is public-protecting or principal-protecting (or some 
third kind our analysis has not yet identified);  and (3) assessing how 
well the occupation, in its present form, is performing its particular 
function.  Each analytic step focuses on professional virtue: whether 
the occupation requires professional virtue for its proper function; 
whether that virtue is principal-protecting or public protecting; and 
how well that occupation, as now organized, is providing that virtue.  
Although this is not the place to carry out a detailed analysis of any 
other occupation in particular, we can specify here in somewhat great-
er detail how that analysis would go, which, in turn, will help sharpen 
our sense of what neo-classical professional virtue entails. 
 
1. Professional Virtue as Neo-Classical, not  
Retro-Victorian 
 
Since professional virtue will be at the center of this inquiry, we 
should first further clarify that core concept.  Most basically, bear in 
mind that the kind of virtue at issue here is classical, not “Victorian,” 
virtue.  Its focus is public life, and primarily work; its concern is not 
private life, and consensual sexual conduct thus generally lies outside 
its scope.
148
  If it helps, put Queen Victoria’s frumpy portraits out of 
mind and recall a marble bust of Marcus Aurelius or, even better, a 
photograph of Abraham Lincoln.    
Classical virtue, strictly speaking, is the condition of anything, 
even an inanimate object, in which that thing does its own work, or 
performs its proper function, well.  Thus, in classical ethics, it made 
sense to say that the virtue of a knife is sharpness and the virtue of a 
horse, speed.
149
  Occupational virtue, by parity of reasoning, is that 
condition of the members of a particular occupation most conducive 
to their performing that occupation’s central task.  Occupational virtue 
would thus include both the knowledge required to perform the rele-
vant task and the dispositions or character traits that lead to that 
  
 148 As the notes to the ABA’s 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
make clear, this focus has not always been appropriately sharp.  See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. (2010) (noting that the traditional concept used to denote 
lapses from professional standards of conduct “moral turpitude . . . can be construed 
to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery 
and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness to practice law”). 
 149 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 32 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991) 
(“‘All right,’ [Socrates] said, ‘does there seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing 
to which some work is assigned?’”); see also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
41 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (“It must, then, be remarked that every virtue or 
excellence (1) renders good the thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) caus-
es it to perform its function well.”). 
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knowledge being applied properly.  We can speak, as Socrates did, of 
the occupational virtues of gardeners or carpenters just as of doctors 
or ministers of state.    
Gardeners must know horticulture; it also behooves them to have 
“green thumbs,” or special skill, innate or acquired, in putting that 
knowledge into practice.  So, too, carpenters must know and apply the 
tools, materials, and skills of their trade.  In the case of physicians the 
relevant knowledge would include anatomy and physiology, and the 
distinctive disposition would be a particularly high level of care for 
the patient’s welfare.  Similarly, the lawyer must not only know both 
technical matters of procedure and substance and broader matters of 
public policy, but also be committed to advancing the public good. 
Professional virtue, then, is a genus of occupational virtue, the op-
timal condition of the practitioner of any occupation for performance 
of that occupation’s central task.  And occupational virtues are in the 
family of classical virtue, the optimal condition of anything in per-
forming its defining function.   
 
2. Professional Virtue, the Virtues of Other   
Occupations, and Other Occupational       
Virtues   
 
The fact that professional virtue is a genus of occupational virtue 
has several important implications for the relationship of the profes-
sions to other occupations.  In the first place, to identify specific vir-
tues as essential to the professions is not to suggest that those who 
work in other occupations are immoral, or even amoral; it is just to 
say, rather, that the virtues that distinguish the professions are distinc-
tive in ways that are essential to their proper functioning.  And so, 
conversely, even though other occupations’ particular organizations 
may help to enhance the performance of their members,
150
 that alone 
does not make those occupations professions. 
In the second place, to say that the virtues distinctive of the pro-
fessions are different from those distinctive of other occupations is not 
to deny that all work properly entails certain common virtues.       
Although, as we have seen, gardeners have their own special virtues, 
knowledge of and skill in horticulture, the better of them also have 
“garden variety” or “work ethic” virtues that are not occupation-
specific but are, instead, important to almost any imaginable occupa-
  
 150 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 
29–31 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1957) (occupations not limited to the classic An-
glo-American professions as guarantors of values not otherwise sustained in modern 
market economies).   
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tion: honesty, discipline, timeliness, efficiency.  To focus on specific 
occupation-related virtues as distinctive of professionals is neither to 
deny, on the one hand, that professionals need these “garden variety” 
virtues, nor to assert, on the other hand, that other occupations need 
them any less, or more.     
Claiming care and public concern as distinctively professional vir-
tues is not tantamount to claiming that they are exclusively profession-
al virtues.  All occupations might perform better if their members took 
more care for the recipients of their service and showed more concern 
for the public good than the law or the market can ensure.  What is 
distinctive about the professions is that these virtues are especially 
important in securing adequate practitioner performance.  Beyond 
some point, the need for that extra care or public commitment be-
comes particularly great; in that respect, professional virtue is more a 
matter of degree than kind.   
Our ordinary language nicely reflects this.  One common use of 
the word “professional” and its cognates captures this universal aspect 
of professional virtue.  We say that someone is a professional, as op-
posed to an amateur or a dilettante, irrespective of that person’s occu-
pation; we mean to say, not that the professional is in any sense mere-
tricious, but rather especially knowledgeable, serious, and committed. 
Identifying these distinctive professional virtues does not imply that 
all members of any profession actually exhibit the relevant virtue.  On 
the contrary, some doctors are only as good as the law requires them 
to be (and, of course, some are even worse than that); some lawyers 
have little or no regard for the public good (and some, little or no re-
gard for basic legality).  It is thus quite possible to say that a practi-
tioner has acted “unprofessionally,” without implying actionable in-
competence or malpractice.  Our theory holds that professional institu-
tions are better guarantors of professional virtue than either the market 
or the state in the absence of those institutions, not that those profes-
sional institutions are themselves perfect.      
This is the paradox of the oft-repeated, much-misleading assertion 
that “professionalism” involves standards above those of both the 
market and the law.  Those standards are not necessarily above what 
clients are willing or able to pay for, nor or they necessarily higher 
than standards readily derivable from the law itself.  Patients might 
well be willing and able to pay all the costs of the best possible medi-
cal care; thoroughly orthodox accounts of the law see it as necessarily 
entailing commitment to the public good on the part of its practition-
ers.
151
  The medical virtue of care is thus not alien to the market, any 
  
 151 LUBAN, supra note 36, at 171.  
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more than the legal virtue of commitment to the public good is extra-
neous to the law.  Both virtues simply promote a level of performance 
above what any combination of enforceable market contracts and 
formal legal sanctions can effectively ensure.   
It is also misleading to say that members of the professions, even 
those who embody those virtues, are somehow more “altruistic” or 
less “selfish” than members of other occupations.  Nor is it quite right 
to say, with Talcott Parsons, that proper professionals take relatively 
more satisfaction in occupational proficiency and esteem of occupa-
tional colleagues, relatively less in monetary rewards and public ac-
claim.
152
  It is more nearly correct to say that professionals’ being so 
motivated is more important to their proper occupational performance.  
Members of other occupations, as we have seen, can and do exhibit 
the levels of care and kind of commitment to the public good charac-
teristic of professionals, and society is the better for it.  The critical 
difference is that these professional virtues are significantly more im-
portant in ensuring proper performance in some occupations than in 
others.  Again, to say that a certain kind of virtue is critical to profes-
sional performance is not to say that professionals alone have that 
virtue.    
It is also important to notice that, under the neo-classical under-
standing of professional virtue, professional institutions supplement 
the ordinary institutions of the law and the market, but they never 
entirely displace them.  Professionals are not “above the law” or “out-
side the market.”  They are subject to laws of general application and 
the competitive pressures of the market.  In fact, many areas of pro-
fessional performance are almost certainly enhanced by holding pro-
fessionals to higher, not lower, standards of performance.  That, to 
take the simplest example, is precisely what professional malpractice 
standards attempt to do.
153
  Similarly, the cost-effective delivery of 
many professional services, including those provided by both doctors 
and lawyers, has doubtlessly been enhanced by competitive pressures.  
Professional institutions are not better guarantors of every aspect of 
professional performance than either the market or the state.  They are 
simply, for the reasons we have seen, better guarantors of professional 
virtue, and the critical need for professional virtue is an essential part 
of what makes an occupation a profession.   
On the other hand, when professional virtue is not an essential 
component of occupational performance, professional institutions can 
be counterproductive, even perverse.  On the consumer side, both 
  
 152 PARSONS, supra note 13.  
 153 See Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice 
Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 878 (2002). 
414 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 345]  
reformist courts and revisionist commentators have identified many 
professional institutions as little more than mechanisms to constrict 
supply or raise prices.   
And scholars are now increasingly realizing, as courts have long 
held, that similar abuses occur on the producers’ side as well, to ex-
ploit certain service providers.
154
  This abuse takes several forms.  
Unscrupulous employers may describe workers as “professionals” in 
order to exclude them from wage, hour, and other labor benefits; em-
ployers may also shift onto “professionals” more work, or more oner-
ous work, rather than hire more workers, buy better equipment, or 
deploy more appropriate procedures.
155
    
 
1. Comparative Perspective: Professionalism in 
Other Times and Places  
 
Professional virtues, on our analysis, are not the only virtues, nor 
even the only occupational virtues.  They are virtues distinctive of 
occupations that have three additional, and distinguishing, features:  
They involve the application of (1) formal knowledge, (2) in the pro-
vision of an essential social service, (3) that can be better ensured by 
professional institutions than market and regulatory measures alone.  
At any given time and place, these three critical factors may be more 
or less strong.  So far, we have limited our analysis to contemporary 
American occupations, focusing on today’s practice of medicine and 
law in the United States.  We should also note, if only briefly, varia-
tions in other times and places, and compare them to our paradigmatic 
  
 154 See Julia Evetts, Introduction: Trust and Professionalism: Challenges and 
Occupational Changes, 54 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 515, 522–24 (2006) (“In general, 
then, as organizational budgets become leaner and customers/clients/governments 
become more demanding, as service work becomes more closely regulated and 
achieving targets are specified, measured, and assessed, so the changes are often 
characterized as the need to ‘professionalize’ the service and knowledge workers 
concerned.”); see also Julia Evetts, Short Note: The Sociology of Professional 
Groups, 54 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 133, 138–39 (“In general, then, as organizational 
budgets become leaner and customers/clients become more demanding, as service 
work becomes more closely regulated and achievement targets are specified, meas-
ured, and assessed, so the changes are often characterized as the need to ‘profession-
alize’ the service and knowledge workers concerned.”). 
 155 Working new doctors’ long hours may well jeopardize their ability to 
deliver proper care.  Faced with that situation, it would be nothing if not perverse to 
call on residents to be more careful, rather than simply to reduce the number of hours 
in their shifts.  See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., DUTY 
HOURS: COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS § VI.G.1 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.acgme.org/acwebsite/home/Common_Program_Requirements_07012011.
pdf. 
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public-protecting and principal-protecting professions, law and medi-
cine. 
a. The Necessary Knowledge Base  
 
Consider, first, the matter of formal knowledge.  Sometimes the 
knowledge required to perform an essential service will not be suffi-
ciently formalized to require its delivery by specialists.  That was cer-
tainly the case with both medicine and law at important points in the 
history of the West. 
As scholars have noted, medicine did not attain a firm foundation 
in modern science until quite late in the nineteenth century; on the 
other hand, it was firmly established in medieval universities, based 
on Islamic preservation of classical Greek texts, by the high middle 
ages.
156
  But, before the time of Galen and Hippocrates, it is not at all 
clear that a sufficient body of formal knowledge, even of a pre-
modern sort, existed to qualify medicine as a proper profession. 
The history of the legal profession illustrates the same factors.  No 
legal profession, under our standards, existed in classical Athens.  For 
one thing, everyone argued his or her own case; legal knowledge had 
not yet become sufficiently formal to require a body of experts.  By 
the time of Socrates, such a body was clearly taking shape in the pro-
gram of the Sophists, who taught the wealthy young men of Athens to 
make their own cases before legal bodies.  By the time of the late 
Roman republic, something identifiable as a prototypical legal profes-
sion appeared—a specially trained body of experts argued cases on 
behalf of others. 
The content of lawyers’ “learning” is not constant either, even in 
modern polities with complex legal systems that purport to serve the 
common good.  For example, a lawyer in the former Soviet Union 
might well have qualified as a professional under our revised defini-
tion.  But the necessary content of his or her education in cultural val-
ues would have been Marxism-Leninism, not the deeper and broader 
culture of the West, and the world.  Similarly, a lawyer in the Islamic 
Republic of Iraq would not likely need to know much Aristotle,    
although it would have been very different for a lawyer in the service 
of the caliphates at Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo.
157
 
 
  
 156 ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 189; see LARSON, supra note 4, at 3. 
 157 See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law and Society: The Interplay of Reve-
lation and Reason in the Shariah, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM 107, 107–53 
(John L. Esposito ed., 1999) (describing the diversity of approaches to law in the 
Islamic tradition, both historically and geographically). 
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b. The Relative Strength of Comple-
mentary Social Institutions 
 
The practice of law in classical Rome also reminds us of a second 
critical factor: the relative roles of the state, the market, and occupa-
tional institutions in guaranteeing professional virtue and hence proper 
professional performance.
158
  In classical Rome, both as a republic 
and as an empire, the state was not under modern liberal constraints 
against promoting a particular vision of the public good.  Accordingly, 
classical Rome had relatively little need for special professional insti-
tutions to promote lawyerly loyalty to the public good; that was com-
fortably part of the job of the law itself. 
Similar factors help account for the relatively greater reliance on 
professional institutions to guarantee professional virtue in modern 
American, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries.  Anglo-
American culture is more reluctant than its Continental and Japanese 
counterparts to rely on instrumentalities of the state to perform social 
functions.  And the converse may also be true: Cultures with relatively 
strong states may be suspicious of strong institutions in the private 
sector, professional associations included.  And some are suspicious 
of the institutions of professionalism in particular for non-statist rea-
sons, seeing them as elitist and thus counter-democratic.   
This discussion, in turn, points to the final relevant factor: The 
relative strength of social institutions may well reflect different under-
lying rankings of the social values that particular occupations serve. 
 
c. The Social Ranking of the Values 
Professions Serve 
 
As a profession’s knowledge base can vary critically over time 
and across cultures, so, too, can the significance that any given society 
assigns to the value that a profession applies its special knowledge to 
serve.  It is hard to imagine a society in which health is not socially 
significant; all societies depend, at some level, on the life and health 
of their individual members.  But it is quite easy to imagine a society 
in which the level of care that our society insists on, at least for its 
better-off members, is not considered significant.   Not all societies 
have taken the health of every (well-off) individual as seriously as we, 
and not all well-off members of those societies have taken their indi-
vidual health as seriously.  In the past, this may have been because the 
after-life loomed larger, or because the level of medical science or 
  
 158 FREIDSON, THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 122.  
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social wealth was too low to make our level of concern a realistic op-
tion to any but a tiny few.  For any number of reasons, then, the level 
of care that requires a special virtue of our doctors may not be a so-
cially significant value.   For that reason, as much as for the lack of an 
adequate knowledge base or strong institutional framework, it may not 
be appropriate to speak, without serious qualification, of a medical 
profession in classical Athens or Rome. 
The contrast between the practice of law in classical Athens and 
in Rome offers an even more telling example of the importance of 
how highly a society values what a given profession provides.  As we 
have seen, Athens had no legal profession; Rome had the unmistaka-
ble beginnings of one.  But Athens and Rome also differed at a much 
deeper level: Athens was a democracy; Rome, a republic.  In a state 
where ultimate legal authority lies in popular votes, appeal to a public 
good beyond the people’s will is, as the case of Socrates shows,159 
problematic.  If one could imagine a pure democracy, where the peo-
ple’s will is instantly and ultimately the law,160 appeal to deep cultural 
values would be legally irrelevant.  Appeal to such values, might, of 
course, be politically persuasive;
161
 nostalgia is a common if not uni-
versal sentiment.  But one could not say, as a matter of law, that any-
thing other than the people’s immediately expressed will had any legal 
significance.  In the absence of something like judicial review, law-
yers, as lawyers, need know little or nothing about the public good as 
anything other than the popular will.   
As where the law is the will of all, so also where it is the will of 
one.  In a classical tyranny, where the will of the monarch was the 
ultimate law,
162
 as in a pure democracy, where the will of the people is 
the ultimate law, the law would have no necessary connection with 
cultural traditions, and lawyers would not need to be learned in them.  
This would not be true, however, of all monarchies: some Roman 
emperors, even after institutional restraints on executive authority had 
almost totally atrophied, aspired to conserve the values of a republican 
constitution.  As the Emperor Trajan reminded the lawyer Pliny the 
Younger, imperial proconsul for the Roman province of Bithynia, 
  
 159 See Plato, The Apology, Phaedo and Crito of Plato, in 2 THE HARVARD 
CLASSICS 3, 21–23 (Charles W. Eliot ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1909). 
 160 See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 34–37 (1970) (out-
lining a computer-based direct and instantaneous democracy). 
 161 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 42–46 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954) (noting the 
rhetorical power of appeals to those with shared values, “friends to whom the same 
things are good or evil”).  162 See PLATO, supra note 149, at 45; ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS 115 (H.W.C. Davis ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008). 
 162 See PLATO, supra note 149, at 45; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 115 (H.W.C. Davis 
ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008). 
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executing people based on mass rumor was not their law, even where 
the alleged offense was an insult to the emperor as symbolic embodi-
ment of that law itself.
163
 
Radical populism has never needed lawyers learned in the shared 
values of a culture’s past.  Indeed, every form of radical populism has 
abhorred both law that constrains the people’s will and the learned 
who remind the people of a public good beyond their private prefer-
ences.
164
  So it was at Socrates’s trial, and so it was in the slogan of 
Shakespeare’s brigand: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the law-
yers.”165  So it has also been under the extremes of French Jacobism, 
American Jacksonianism,
166
 Russian Bolshevism, and Chinese Mao-
ism.  Radical populism cannot tolerate a profession of lawyers com-
mitted to classical notions of the public good, even as classical repub-
licanism cannot survive without them.  
 
C. Paradigm Professions and Our Society:  Law and 
Medicine as Both Limiting Cases and Cultural 
Mirrors 
 
Our paradigmatic professions, law and medicine, demonstrate that 
the status of a particular occupation can change over time and differ 
across cultures.  I have argued that law and medicine, at present, meet 
all the basic criteria.  But, conditions in our society could change in 
ways that would strip either of its professional status.   
  
 163 PLINY, PLINY: A SELF PORTRAIT IN LETTERS 243 (Betty Radice trans., 
1978). 
 164 See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 162 
n.7 (“Revolutions represent the installation of new (though often temporary) legal 
institutions.”); id. at 167 n.11 (“In the case of law, popular justice has a short life.”) 
(citing EUGENE HUSKEY, RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BAR 1917-1939, at 81–82 (1986), for the example of 
Lenin’s abolition of the Russian bar in 1921, only to reinstate it later that same year, 
with particular reference to the need for defense counsel). 
 165 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 
4, sc. 2. 
 166 Lest the inclusion of Jacksonian democracy in this litany of populist ex-
cesses seem to mark a lapse into hyperbole, or worse, remember the Seminole Wars 
and the Cherokee removals.  With respect to Marshall’s opinion for the Cherokees’ 
position in Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), Old Hickory may never actu-
ally have said, “Justice Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it,” but 
he certainly seems to have acted on the principle.  See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 428 (2005) (noting that, when “the 
Cherokee soon found themselves in need of federal protection” from illegal incur-
sions and physical violence and advised the President of their plight, “Jackson did 
nothing”). 
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But pressing our analysis of the professions back to the critical 
social functions that they serve brings us to another, and very differ-
ent, set of limits.  Even as medicine and law provide the paradigms of 
our two subspecies of neo-classical professions, the caring and the 
public, so these professions also provide limiting cases of the kind of 
society that they serve.  A society could, quite conceivably, cease to 
treat concern for individual outcomes in any kind of service-delivery 
as warranting special care.  So, too, a society could cease to treat con-
cern for the public good beyond the aggregation of private preferences 
as warranting special commitment.  But either of these societies 
would be dramatically different from our own.  The society that need-
ed no special virtue of care would be much less individualistic than 
ours;
167
 the society that needed no special virtue of public commit-
ment would be much less republican than ours.
168
 
In pressing our analysis of the professions back to the critical so-
cial functions that they serve, and the virtues that their practitioners 
need in order to perform those functions, we thus come round to a 
better understanding not just of our professions, but also of our socie-
ty.  Ours is a society that places a particularly high premium on the 
health of individual citizens; ours is also a society in which the will of 
the majority, at least as expressed in ordinary legislation, is subordi-
nate to a vision of the public good entrusted to professionals whose 
function is, in essential part, to preserve and extend that good as tradi-
tionally understood.
169
  Certain virtues, care for individual patients 
and commitment to the public good, are essential for our two para-
digm professions to serve that kind of society. 
This raises, in turn, another fundamental point about that society 
itself:  For it to function well, to guarantee the kind of care and public 
good to which it is committed, it must assign the relevant profession-
als the appropriate roles and ensure that the practitioners of those pro-
fessions have what they need adequately to perform those roles.  Even 
as our society depends on its paradigm professions for the protection 
of its core values, so those paradigm professions depend on our 
  
 167 See LARSON, supra note 4, at 19 (“The general ideological climate of 
Western societies has favored the functions medicine claims to serve; the value of 
individual life, rooted in the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition, and individualism in 
general, have formed one of the strongest ideological dimensions of the post-feudal 
world.”). 
 168 See letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Nov. 17, 1775), in 
REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 1775-1783, at 33 (Gordon Wood ed., 2011) (“Virtue, my 
young Friend, Virtue alone is or can be the Foundation of our new Governments, and 
it must be encouraged by Rewards, in every Department civil and military.”). 
 169 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (opinion by Justice Frank-
furter discussing the concept of “ordered liberty”). 
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broader society to ensure them their proper place.  Our society is, of 
course, a liberal democracy, not Plato’s Republic; we are ruled, not by 
Platonic guardians, but by the people’s elected representatives and 
officials.  Our fundamental law bans titles of nobility;
170
 we cannot 
have kings, much less philosopher kings.  But our constitution also 
establishes a republican form of government, even as it guarantees 
that form of government to the states.
171
  Our highest law, the Consti-
tution itself, is in the hands of judges,
172
 and our judges must therefore 
be scholars of the values our culture holds most dear.  If our lawyers 
are to understand them and influence them, they must be scholars, too.    
If our democracy is to be truly liberal, constrained by principles 
beyond the will of any current majority, then our liberalism must be 
shaped by the demands of our professions.  And so it is.  Our society’s 
fundamental law includes Roe v. Wade, with its guarantee that access 
to medical procedures essential to fundamental human rights cannot 
be legally denied, even as Roe v. Wade rests on Marbury v. Madison, 
with its echoing declaration that is the fundamental province of the 
courts to say what the law ultimately is: what it allows, and forbids, 
and requires. 
 
CONCLUSION:  FROM THE VIRTUES OF THE PROFESSIONS TO 
THE VALUES OF THE REPUBLIC 
 
Our society, as Socrates noted in the passage from The Gorgias
173
 
that I quoted at the outset, values, very near its foundations, health and 
justice.  Under the conditions of our world, even more than his, those 
twin values imply two paradigmatic professions, medicine and law, 
one devoted to extraordinary care in attending the health of individu-
als, the other committed to tempering private interests with concern 
for the public good. 
Contrary to previous accounts, both functionalist and revisionist, 
this account of professionalism in law and medicine has argued that 
only public-protective professions like law essentially entail the wed-
ding of university-based technical knowledge with broad cultural edu-
cation in the liberal arts.  Lawyers need to know our culture’s deepest 
values in order to form the counterweight to both popular majorities 
and plutocratic minorities that is the critical liberal constraint on our 
  
 170 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.  
 171 U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4.  
 172 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 173 See supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
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political regime;
174
 doctors do not need that knowledge to provide 
even the most scrupulous care to their individual patients. 
But this account also implies a reason why others, not only schol-
ars of the professions but also members of the medical profession 
themselves, have insisted on liberal education for doctors.  Although 
liberal education is not essential to the proper exercise of doctors’ 
defining professional virtue, it has a value in our society that is both 
deeper and broader.   The value of liberal education is deeper, because 
it is not just the foundation of the virtue of any particular profession, 
no matter how essential that profession to our society.  Liberal educa-
tion is, rather, the foundation of what we take to be a fully realized 
human character, the fullest possible knowledge of oneself and one’s 
world.  To paraphrase Socrates, it is what we need both to know our-
selves and to live an examined life.  
The neo-classically republican element of our society teaches us 
to see wisdom not just as the essential virtue of those who make and 
apply our law, but as the highest human virtue as well.  A neo-
classical republic must ensure that its lawyers are liberally learned, in 
order to serve justice. But that justice entails the maximum cultivation 
of all human talent.  And so, in a proper republic, even as we as a so-
ciety need our doctors to be careful, in order to be good doctors, we 
will also want them to be liberally learned, to make them the best pos-
sible people.  And this societal norm has implications at the personal 
level as well.  We as individuals want those who hold our lives in 
their hands to be wise as well as careful, even as those who do not 
need liberal learning in their professional lives nonetheless value it in 
their personal lives. 
The value of liberal education is also broader than any other value 
served by even the most important profession, for it is the ultimate 
guarantor of truly republican self-government.  In a proper republic, 
not just lawyers and judges, but every full citizen, would both know 
the public good and be committed to its advancement.  The revolu-
tionary excesses of the French Jacobins have made “Republic of Vir-
tue” something of a byword; it was our own  Federalists, no Franco-
philes and certainly no radicals, who said, “The aim of every political 
Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers men who pos-
sess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common 
good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual 
  
 174 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).  
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precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold 
their public trust.”175 
And this is the final lesson we can draw from our paradigm pro-
fessions for our fuller society.  If our society is to be meaningfully, 
not just nominally, republican, it must do more than simply allow 
every citizen to express his or her personal preferences in public fora 
and political elections.  It must give every citizen the fullest possible 
opportunity to gain the kind of cultural knowledge and self-
understanding that is the essential foundation of the legal profession.  
We need doctors to be liberally educated, not because our health de-
pends upon them as professionals, but because our republic depends 
upon them as citizens.  And this implies, ultimately, that the rulers of 
our Republic must be both as caring as doctors and as learned as law-
yers: 
 
Therefore the first and weightiest commandment of God to the 
rulers is this – that more than aught else they be good guardians of 
and watch zealously over the offspring.
176
    
    
  
 175 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) 
(Modern Library ed., 1937). 
 176 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 44 (A.D. Lindsay trans., Everyman’s Library ed. 
1992). 
